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ABSTRACT
Potential criminals make decisions about whether and how to commit crimes
based on a variety of factors such as personal and environmental considerations in-
cluding crime prevention policies. Disentangling the effects of government policies
from other confounding factors can be a significant challenge in empirical analy-
sis of such policies. Quasi-experimental methods like natural experiments can help
distinguish the effects. In this dissertation, I use such methods to determine the
effectiveness of sex offender registries, the effect of housing vouchers on criminal ac-
tivity and the effect of juvenile curfews and rain on crime. I find that an extension
of the required sex offender registry length in North Carolina does not decrease sex
offense recidivism as desired but that it does reduce the probability that an offender
violates probation or other court regulations. This research also shows that receiving
a housing voucher makes male heads of household more likely to be arrested for a vi-
olent offense. Lastly, this work shows that juvenile curfews are ineffective at reducing
crime in Washington D. C. and demonstrates that incapacitating criminals by send-
ing them inside may be an effective policy by showing that rain does reduce crime.
These three results highlight the general difficulty in designing effective anti-crime
policy as well as poverty assistance programs.
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1. INTRODUCTION: DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION IN THE
ECONOMICS OF CRIME
The economics of crime is concerned with determining the effects that various
circumstances have on the commission of crime. These circumstances can be policies
aimed at crime-reduction, other types of social directives or even natural circum-
stances.
There are two main channels through which these circumstances impact crime:
incapacitation and deterrence. Incapacitation works by making the cost of being in
a situation in which to commit crime higher. A primary example of incapacitation
is incarceration, but any policy that reduces crime opportunities can be considered
an incapacitation policy.
Deterrence works by altering the costs of committing a crime. In his seminal eco-
nomics of crime paper in 1968, Becker suggested that the cost of crime is determined
by both the potential penalty and the probability of apprehension. There are two
well-established literatures in the economics of crime that quantify the effectiveness
of altering both the penalties (e.g. Hansen, 2014; Abrams, 2012; Drago, Galbiati,
and Vertova, 2009) and the probability of apprehension (e.g. Levitt, 1997; Doleac,
2012).
The three sections of this dissertation all address various aspects of incapacitation
and deterrence.
In the first section, entitled “The Effectiveness of Sex Offender Registries: Ev-
idence from a Natural Experiment,” I explore the effect of extending the length of
sex offender registries on recidivism. Sex offender registries can be thought of as
both incapacitating previous offenders and as deterring future offenders. The stated
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goal of extending the length for which previous offenders are required to register is
to reduce recidivist sex offenses by keeping the public aware of an individuals sex
offender status. This public awareness could act as an incapacitating factor.
I study this registry using a natural experiment that extended the registry period
from 10 years to 30 years in 2006. A similar set of offenders was removed from the
registry after 10 years. The only difference between these two groups is whether
they initially registered as a sex offender before or after December 1, 1996. I find
that registry extension has no effect on the prevalence of recidivist sex crimes, but
it does reduce the probability that an offender will violate probation or other court
regulations. This change in compliance behavior could be due to the extra contact
with law enforcement required of registrants.
The second section addresses the effect of housing vouchers distributed through
the Housing Choice Voucher Program (also known as Section 8) on arrests of recip-
ients, and it is titled “The Effect of Housing Vouchers on Crime: Evidence from a
Lottery.” The housing vouchers provide a substantial income transfer to the recip-
ients of over 60% of their annual income. This sizeable transfer can work to deter
crime by reducing the relative gains from it or by increasing the relative costs because
participants can lose their benefits if they are arrested.
We study the program in Houston, and the Houston Housing Authority used a
randomized lottery to assign waitlist positions that determine when an individual
receives a voucher. Using this lottery to isolate the randomness in the timing of
voucher receipt, we determine that receiving a voucher causes an increase in violent
crime arrests and that this increase is driven by the males in our sample. The
observed change in neighborhood quality for the voucher recipients is small, so we
attribute this change to the large income transfer. The transfer could facilitate the
purchase of goods that are complements to crime such as drugs, alcohol and guns,
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and it may allow the recipients to work less. Because the violent crime arrests are
primarily for assaults, we believe that these mechanisms are quite plausible.
In the final section, “Keep the Kids Inside: Juvenile Curfews, Bad Weather, and
Urban Gun Violence,” we study the effects of various incapacitation policies while
exploring issues related to crime data quality. Juvenile curfews aim to incapaci-
tate teenagers to prevent them from participating in various problematic behaviors
including crime. Rain works as a natural incapacitating “policy” in that it sends
potential criminals inside. We identify these effects using the randomness of rain
and a summer change in curfew hours.
Both policies are analyzed in the city of Washington, D.C., using a unique
dataset of time-stamped geocoded gunshots from a crime detection technology called
“ShotSpotter” as well as crime reported to the Metro Police Department. We find
that while rain does cause a decrease in reported crime and gunshots, juvenile cur-
fews do not. Importantly, we find that simply using the reported crime data to
analyze the curfews could lead to different findings for Anacostia, where the sensors
were first implemented.
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2. THE EFFECT OF SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES ON RECIDIVISM:
EVIDENCE FROM A NATURAL EXPERIMENT
2.1 Introduction
Sex offender registries have been instituted across the US in the previous few
decades in hopes of reducing sex crimes. Registry laws stipulate that offenders con-
victed of certain sexually-oriented offenses submit and update physical descriptions
and address information as well as photos to local authorities. Current federal law
requires that states host registry websites containing this information that can be
used by the public to search for offenders. Offenders are required to register for
lengthy periods, sometimes even for life. Sex offender registries aid law enforcement
in pinpointing likely recidivist offenders for new crimes and make offenders known
within their communities. Both of these forces should lead to fewer sex crimes. Con-
versely, as a registered offender’s quality of life decreases due to the stigma and other
costs associated with prolonged registry, he or she may be more likely to recidivate.
The existing empirical evidence on this question is inconclusive. Studies typically
follow one of two approaches. One set of studies compares the outcomes of those
required to register to those who were not required to register. Often, which offenders
are required to register is determined by criteria such as previous sex offense severity.
Some existing studies compare across these groups (for example, Duwe and Donnay,
2008). Other studies compare those offenders who were required to register to those
who were not based on prison release date, sentencing date, or offense date (Agan,
2011; Duwe and Donnay, 2008; Zgoba, Veysey, and Dalessandro, 2010; Maddan,
Miller, Walker, and Marshall, 2011). In some states, there is room for parole boards,
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judges and offenders, to manipulate these dates, introducing the possibility for bias.1
Given lingering concerns about selection into the registry, another literature uses
state-level variation in policies to identify effects, and similarly finds mixed results.2
While these studies are well-suited for providing credible evidence on the effect of
registries on state-level crimes, it is more difficult to disentangle the effects on of-
fenders from the effects on non-offenders. One exception is Prescott and Rockoff
(2011), who interact the number of registered offenders with treatment indicators to
estimate this effect.
In this paper, I overcome the selection issue by exploiting a natural experiment
in which a group of sex offenders were removed from North Carolina’s sex offender
registry in 2006. State legislators extended registry from 10 years to 30 years, ap-
plicable to all current registrants. Because around 900 offenders had already been
removed because their registry had expired, whether an offender’s registry was ex-
tended depends on the date on which he or she originally registered 10 years earlier.
This allows for a comparison between these two groups using a regression disconti-
nuity design, where the original date of registration (ten years earlier) is the running
variable.
This empirical model hinges on the assumption that the offenders and authorities
could not manipulate on which side of the cutoff offenders fell. There is little reason
to believe that this type of manipulation is possible. Each offender’s registry date
1These studies find that either registries reduce recidivism (Barnoski, 2005; Duwe and Donnay,
2008; Zgoba, Veysey, and Dalessandro, 2010) or that they have no effect on recidivism (Agan, 2011;
Maddan, Miller, Walker, and Marshall, 2011; Schram and Milloy, 1995; Adkins, Huff, Stageberg,
Prell, and Musel, 2000; Zgoba, Veysey, and Dalessandro, 2010).
2Many of the state-level studies find no consistent effects either way (Ackerman, Sacks, and
Greenberg, 2012; Sandler, Freeman, and Socia, 2008; Vasquez, Maddan, and Walker, 2008; Walker,
Maddan, Vasquez, VanHouten, and Ervin-McLarty, 2005; Maurelli and Ronan, 2013), though others
report that registries reduce aggregate sex crimes (Prescott and Rockoff, 2011; Letourneau, Bandy-
opadhyay, Armstrong, and Sinha, 2010). Ackerman, Sacks, and Greenberg (2012) and Prescott and
Rockoff (2011) employ difference-in-differences methodologies, and the other studies mentioned use
time series methods.
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was set in 1996 or 1997 when he or she first registered, while the cutoff date for the
registry extension was not announced until 2006. In order to manipulate whether an
offender was removed from the registry, a party would have had to not only anticipate
that the registry date would affect registry length, but also predict the cutoff date
10 years prior to its announcement.
Empirically, there is no evidence of such manipulation. I verify that the density
of the registry date is smooth, and I test whether there are discontinuities across
the cutoff in observable offender characteristics (including criminal record). If a
party had manipulated registry dates to make sure that the restriction applied to
more offenders, or at least the most dangerous offenders, then one would expect the
groups on either side of the cutoff to differ in quantity or observable characteristics.
This study makes two main contributions to the existing literature. First, to my
knowledge this is the first study to explicitly analyze the effect of extending time on
the registry, which contrasts with the existing literature that focuses on the impact
of being registered at all. Registry length is an important aspect of sex offender
registry policies. In fact, the Adam Walsh Act mandated federal minimums across
states in 2006 (McPherson, 2007). Although results are specific to the group of
previously registered offenders, and represent a local average treatment effect, they
are still informative in the debate on sex offender registries more generally. The
second contribution of this study is that I am able to use a simple yet compelling
research design that under reasonable identifying assumptions can distinguish the
effect of registry extension from confounding factors.
I find no evidence that registry extension reduces sex offense recidivism, which is
the stated goal of the extension. I do find suggestive evidence that registry extension
may cause a reduction in the likelihood of recidivating with regulatory infractions
such as post-release revocations, possession of a firearm by a felon and obstruct-
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ing justice. These results support the ineffectiveness of sex offender registries at
preventing serious offenses, particularly sex offenses, and are in line with a signifi-
cant portion of the literature on sex offender registries (Agan, 2011; Maddan, Miller,
Walker, and Marshall, 2011; Zgoba, Veysey, and Dalessandro, 2010). They may sug-
gest, though, that additional contact with law enforcement can help keep previous
offenders compliant with various regulations.
The evidence suggesting the ineffectiveness of sex offender registries is striking
in light of the significant costs incurred by both law enforcement and sex offenders
as a result of keeping individuals on the registry. That is, evidence here suggests
that the significant social and logistical costs associated with keeping offenders on
the registry for an extended period of time may not be fully justified by the benefits.
2.2 Background
North Carolina’s sex offender registry went into effect on January 1, 1996. Offend-
ers who were convicted of a qualifying offense or released from a penal institution for
one of the applicable offenses after that date were required to register for 10 years
(Senate Bill 53, S.L. 1995-545). From the start, the North Carolina sex offender
registry was public information.
In 2006, the North Carolina state legislature voted to extend the registry period
for sex offenders from 10 years to 30 years, and they applied the extension to all active
registrants as of December 1, 2006 (House Bill 1896, S.L. 2006-247). The timing of
the laws passage created a subset of offenders, those who registered between January
1, 1996, and November 30, 1996, whose registry period expired before the law took
effect (Markham, 2013; Rubin, 2007). In contrast, offenders who had registered on
or after December 1, 1996, remained on the registry. Comparing across these two
groups of sex offenders will form the basis for my identification strategy, described
7
in detail in the next section.
Not all offenders whose registry was extended will fulfill the 30 year registry
requirement. Offenders who die or move to another state are removed from the
North Carolina registry. Additionally, the same legislation that extended the registry
created a means by which an offender can petition to have his or her name removed
from the registry after spending 10 years on it.3 The results section contains more
detailed analysis on the effect of such petitions on registry, but I estimate that no
more than about 20% of offenders are removed through successful petitions within 3
years of eligibility.
Economic theory is ambiguous as to whether the offenders for whom the registry
period was extended in 2006 should be less likely to commit crimes. On one hand,
keeping their information on the registry makes it more likely that their sex offender
status is known to social contacts, which could limit access to potential victims.
Additionally, the registry serves as an immediate aid to law enforcement in child
abduction or abuse emergencies in identifying likely suspects and their whereabouts,
potentially deterring recidivism by increasing the probability that an offender is
caught.4
On the other hand, offenders may be more likely to commit crimes after the reg-
istry period is extended. Prescott and Rockoff (2011) suggest that public notification
of sex offender status can increase recidivism by decreasing the opportunity cost of
3All but the most serious offenders are allowed to petition for removal starting 10 years from their
original registry dates. For a petition to be successful, the offender must have not been arrested for
a registry-qualifying offense since he or she registered, and a trial court must determine that he or
she is not a “current or potential threat to public safety” (Markham, 2013).
4The criminal cost-benefit decision making process is a staple in the economics of crime litera-
ture, stemming from Becker’s seminal economics of crime paper (1968) in which he suggested that
criminals have an additional cost consideration that other economic actors may not - the probability
of detection and the resulting punishment. Two parallel literatures exist on the effects of changing
the probability of punishment (e.g. Levitt, 1997; Doleac, 2012) and variation in the severity of
punishment (e.g. Hansen, 2014; Abrams, 2012; Drago, Galbiati, and Vertova, 2009).
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crime. In this setting, the opportunity cost of crime is the benefit received from abid-
ing by the law. Regulations that diminish an offender’s quality of life reduce this
benefit. For example, these restrictions make it difficult for offenders to build social
connections due to the stigma. In addition, a number of surveys of sex offenders
have confirmed difficulty in obtaining housing (for example, Mercado, Alvarez, and
Levenson, 2008; Levenson, 2008) and jobs (for example, Levenson and Cotter, 2005;
Tewksbury, 2005). All of these effects decrease an offender’s quality of life and po-
tentially reduce the opportunity cost of crime, disincentivizing law-abiding behavior.
These economic roadblocks may also drive offenders to commit financially-motivated
crimes such as theft.
There are a number of competing influences that may cause offenders to either
commit more or less offenses when their registry is extended. The net effect of
registry extension on recidivism will have to be determined empirically.
2.3 Identification and Methods
I identify the effect of sex offender registry extension on recidivism by comparing
those whose registry was barely extended to those whose registry was barely allowed
to expire. It is important to emphasize that whether an offender’s registry was
extended or allowed to expire depends on what date the offender originally registered
as a sex offender 10 years before the extension. This is critical since it means that
policymakers in 2006 did not exercise choice over which offenders would get removed
and which would continue to stay on the registry. In addition, it would have been
impossible for judges, prosecutors, or sex offenders to predict 10 years earlier that
the registry date of December 1, 1996, would determine whether an offender’s duty
to register expired after 10 years or was extended.
I use a regression discontinuity design to estimate the effect of remaining on the
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registry. This experimental design will identify the effect of registry extension at the
cutoff; the estimates will compare the individuals just after the cutoff to those just
before. Formally, I estimate the model:
Outcomei = α + β1RegistryExtendedi + β2f(RegistryDatei) + ui (2.1)
I allow the polynomial function of the release date (f(RegistryDatei)) to vary on
either side of the cutoff by using separate polynomials for the “registry extended”
group.
The identifying assumption in the RDD model is that all other determinants of
recidivism vary smoothly across this time threshold. Because the running variable
was assigned 10 years before the cutoff was set, the timing of this cutoff is in all
likelihood exogenous to offenders and their characteristics.
To support the validity of this empirical strategy, I perform a number of tests
designed to detect any evidence that assignment to the groups is not exogenous. I
first verify that the registry date does not exhibit signs of manipulation. One method
is to check for signs of displacement in the distribution of registry dates. If there
is manipulation in the expected direction, there would be a trough in the density
just before the effective date and a peak just after. Manipulation could take another
form, though - rather than the number of individuals changing discontinuously, the
composition could be changing. To test for this type of manipulation, I check for
discontinuities at the cutoff in observable characteristics. Discontinuities could signal
that the groups close to the cutoff are not merely different in whether their registry
expired, but in other ways that may bias estimates. Additionally, I estimate all
models with and without control variables. This tests whether these observable
factors appear to be correlated with whether an offender’s registry was extended. If
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the estimates do not change with the addition of these controls, it can be taken as
support that registry extension is in fact exogenous.
In order to confirm that the registry date does in fact indicate whether an in-
dividual was removed from the registry, I compare whether the “registry expired”
group is less likely to appear on the registry after the extension than the “registry
extended” group. I estimate equation 2.1 using an indicator variable for whether the
offender appeared on the registry on November 13, 2012, as the outcome variable.5
Whether an offender was registered in 2012 is unlikely to accurately reflect continued
registry during the period over which recidivism is measured because I measure re-
cidivism over the 2006-2009 period. I use samples of offenders registered at different
times to provide evidence to suggest what portion of the offenders whose registry
was extended were still registered after various periods of time.
I estimate the main outcome models by estimating equation 2.1 using ordinary
least squares. In addition to testing for sex crime recidivism, I also test for an effect
on the likelihood of recidivating with any type of crime, property crimes, violent
crimes, drug and alcohol crimes and court-related procedural infractions.
2.4 Data
Data on offenders and their criminal histories come from the North Carolina De-
partment of Public Safety’s Offender Public Information website (North Carolina
Department of Public Safety, 2013). Demographic, sentence, and punishment infor-
mation on all individuals convicted since 1972 (for all types of offenses) is available
for download in bulk from this website. Below, I refer to these data as the “DPS
data.”
Data from the North Carolina Sex Offender and Public Protection Registry were
5November 13, 2012, is the date on which the data were downloaded.
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downloaded from the North Carolina Department of Justice website (North Carolina
Department of Justice, 2013). At the time of download, the website contained infor-
mation on all offenders registered on November 13, 2012. Throughout the paper, I
will call these data the “registry data.”
The registry data have one obvious shortcoming they only exist for offenders
registered at the time of download. Most information can be obtained from the DPS
data, but the offenders’ initial registry dates are only available in the registry data
for the offenders who remain on the sex offender registry. Since my research design
also requires a registry date for individuals who are no longer registered, I exploit
the fact that North Carolina law required that offenders register within 10 days of
release from prison or sentencing to probation (SB 53, S.L. 1995-545). These two
dates are reported in the DPS records, and I use them to proxy for the registry date
for all offenders. I will simply refer to this date as the “registry date” going forward.
I use this date to designate which offenders are classified as “registry expired” and
“registry extended,” and I study samples that include offenders registered within 6
months and 11 months of the cutoff. Because the registry began on January 1, 1996,
only offenders who registered within the first 11 months of the registry can belong to
the “registry expired” group. This makes the 11 month bandwidth (22 months total)
the largest possible. Individuals with release or sentencing dates between January 1,
1996, and October 31, 1997, serve at the main study group.
Because the DPS data include all convictions in the state of North Carolina, I
can construct criminal history variables to use as controls. I create measures for
both the number of offenses and the number of sex offenses of which an offender
was convicted before he or she registered. I am also able to construct a count of the
number of times an offender has been incarcerated and the total amount of time he
or she spent incarcerated before registry. These measures, along with offender age,
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race, and ethnicity, are empirically-supported predictors of recidivism (Langan and
Levin, 2002).
Similarly, I generate outcome variables using this dataset by determining whether
an offender was convicted of any sex offenses within 3 years after removal from the
registry or registry extension. I measure the outcomes for the first 3 years because it
is a standard in recidivism studies and as such will allow for comparison.6 I replicate
the main results table for recidivism within 1 to 5 years in Appendix A.1.7 I build
a similar measure for offenses of any type, violent crimes, property crimes, drug and
alcohol offenses, and regulation-based infractions.8
In order to confirm that the group of offenders whose registry expired in 2006
were removed from the registry, I match the DPS data to the registry data using an
identification number assigned to individuals by the North Carolina Department of
Corrections. I also perform a secondary match on name and birthday for offenders
for whom there is no listed Department of Corrections number in the registry data.
Table 2.1 contains summary statistics; it shows means and standard deviations
of recidivism measures and control variables for the “registry expired” group and the
“registry extended” group. The first row of the table corresponds to the measure
of continued registry discussed in the previous paragraph. The difference in means
indicates that the “registry expired” group is on average 36.7 percentage points less
likely to appear on the registry in 2012. This difference is significant at the 1% level.
For both groups, around 1.5% recidivate with another sex offense, whereas around
16% of offenders recidivate within 3 years by committing a crime of any type. Most
6Many recidivism studies use data collected by the Bureau of Justice Statistics on prisoners
released in 1994. These data contain recidivism information for the first 3 years after release
(Langan and Levin, 2002).
7Results for various recidivism time frames generally support the finding that sex offender reg-
istries do not effect recidivism with the exception of the two year window.
8I include a full list of the offenses in each category in Appendix A.2.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
registry registry
expired extended
registered in 2012 0.187 0.554
(0.390) (0.497)
any offense type: whether offender recidivated 0.131 0.113
(0.338) (0.317)
sex offense: whether offender recidivated 0.016 0.012
(0.125) (0.109)
property offense: whether offender recidivated 0.016 0.020
(0.125) (0.141)
violent offense: whether offender recidivated 0.033 0.024
(0.177) (0.154)
drug or alcohol offense: whether offender recidivated 0.038 0.046
(0.192) (0.211)
procedural offense: whether offender recidivated 0.019 0.014
(0.136) (0.118)
proportion black 0.402 0.387
(0.491) (0.487)
proportion Hispanic 0.005 0.004
(0.070) (0.063)
age 34.655 34.553
(11.921) (12.514)
proportion male 0.990 0.985
(0.099) (0.122)
num. previous convictions 3.109 3.016
(3.302) (3.309)
num. previous sex offenses 1.394 1.427
(0.741) (0.774)
num. previous incarcerations 1.825 1.775
(1.942) (1.966)
days incarcerated 846.480 937.123
(1468.354) (1490.555)
num. of observations 1015 990
Notes: Summary statistics are reported for the “registry expired” group (estimated registry dates from January
1, 1996, to November 30, 1996) and the “registry extended” group (estimated registry dates December 1, 1996, to
October 31, 1997). For offenders sentenced to incarceration, the registry date is estimated using release date. For
individuals sentenced to probation, it is sentencing date. Recidivism measures are for the 3 years after an offender’s
expected registry expiration date. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
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offenders are white, but nearly 40% are black. Less than 1% of offenders are His-
panic. Nearly 99% of offenders are male and the average age is around 35. On
average, offenders have 3 previous convictions and 1.4 previous sex offense convic-
tions (including the offense that qualified him or her for the registry). They have
been to jail 1.8 times and have spent just over 2 years total incarcerated.
No differences in these means are significant even at the 10% level, which indicates
that at least the observable determinants of recidivism do not vary systematically
across the two groups. Nevertheless, to identify effects I will compare those whose
registry was barely allowed to expire to those whose registry was barely extended to
allow for any time or age effects that could be different across these groups
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Tests of identifying assumption
The identifying assumption of the model is that the determinants of recidivism
vary smoothly across the cutoff. There are few ex ante reasons to doubt this assump-
tion in this context. It would be violated if judges, prosecutors, or sex offenders were
able to affect which offenders were subject to the restriction and which ones were
not. It is worth emphasizing that manipulation along these lines seems implausible,
if not impossible, given that the running variable was defined 10 years earlier, but
nonetheless I test for evidence of strategic behavior.
One example of such behavior is that authorities could have delayed offenders’
prison releases until after the cutoff or scheduled more sentencing hearings after the
cutoff in order to maximize the number of offenders subject to the extension. If this
were the case, upon examining the density of registry dates, we would see a dip just
before the effective date and a peak just after. In order to support that this is not
the case, I show the density of the registry date for the full 11 month sample binned
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Figure 2.1: Density of the Running Variable
Notes: For offenders sentenced to incarceration, the registry date is estimated using release date. For individuals
sentenced to probation, it is sentencing date. The vertical line denotes the effective date of the legislation.
by week in Figure 2.1. The vertical line denotes the cutoff date and the x-axis is the
registry date. There is no evidence of this type of strategic behavior, but there is a
slight dip a few bins after the cutoff which corresponds to the winter court holidays.9
However improbable given the required foresight, we could also worry that au-
thorities attempted to rearrange sentencing dates or prison release dates to extend
the registry length for higher-risk offenders. In order to demonstrate that there are
no compositional changes in the types of individuals across the threshold, I verify
that no covariates exhibit a discontinuity at the cutoff. If I were to detect a dis-
continuity, it could indicate that the individuals whose registry dates fell just before
the cutoff (whose registry expired) are not a good counterfactual for the individuals
whose registry was extended.
9Using historical data to assign would-be registry dates to offenders released starting in 1972,
I find that only 1,812 offenders are assigned dates during the last week of the year, which is the
lowest for any week. The mean (excluding the week in question) is 2,683 offenders.
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Figure 2.2: Tests of RDD Specification
Notes: The running variable is the estimated registry date. Local averages are reported for 60 day bins. Race,
ethnicity and gender are measured by dummy variables. “Previous offenses” is the number of offenses and “previous
sex offenses” is the number of sex offenses for which an offender was convicted before he or she was required to register.
“Previous incarcerations” is the number of separate incarceration sentences before registry and the “previous years
incarcerated” is the total years served before registry.
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Figure 2.2 displays RDD graphs using each covariate as the dependent variable.
The running variable (and x-axis) is the registry date, and each figure contains
local averages, denoted by circles, and linearly-fitted estimates for a different control
variable. The vertical line marks the cutoff date for registry extension, and the
maximal 11 month bandwidth is displayed. The first row of figures corresponds to the
race and ethnicity dummies. The first figure in the second row relates to the gender
composition of offenders, and the second figure is produced using the offenders’ ages.
The remaining figures in Figure 2.2 are generated using the constructed criminal
history variables.10
Table 2.2 contains the corresponding regression estimates, which were obtained
by estimating equation 1 with each control variable serving as the outcome variable.
The rows of Table 2 are labeled with the control variable being used as the dependent
variable, and the reported values are the coefficient on “registry extended.”
All estimates are statistically indistinguishable from zero with the exception of
the binary indicator for whether the offender is identified as black in estimates for
the 6 month bandwidth. This discontinuity seems to be driven by the fact that
in the first 60 days (the first dot) directly after the cutoff, there are relatively few
registering black offenders. Only 29.7% of offenders registered during that time were
black, compared to an average of around 35%. This reduction in the proportion of
black offenders is likely statistical noise. If it were due to manipulation of registry
dates around the cutoff, offenders registered just after the cutoff could drive biased
results. When the offenders registered in the first 60 days after the effective date
are omitted, there is no longer a discontinuity in the racial composition of offenders.
10Although some of the figures in Figure 2.2 exhibit jumps at the cutoff, none of these disconti-
nuities are statistically significant. Additionally, it is important to think about whether fitting one
model across both sides together would be more convincing than the fitting them separately - in
many parts of this figure, this seems to be true.
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Table 2.2: Tests of RDD Specification
11 month bandwidth 6 month bandwidth
(1) (2)
proportion black -0.048 -0.178***
(0.046) (0.060)
proportion Hispanic 0.005 0.008
(0.008) (0.013)
proportion male 0.004 0.004
(0.009) (0.012)
age -0.198 0.163
(1.097) (1.475)
num. previous convictions -0.225 -0.168
(0.283) (0.361)
num. previous sex offenses 0.031 0.045
(0.065) (0.084)
num. previous incarcerations -0.265 -0.193
(0.178) (0.236)
days incarcerated -106.108 -54.163
(134.311) (174.171)
num. of observations 2005 1069
controls no no
time polynomial linear linear
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Each value in the table is generated by a separate regression in which the
control variable for which the row is named is the dependent variable, and the independent variables are “registry
extended” (for which the coefficient is reported) and a polynomial function of estimated registry date (the running
variable). The polynomial date function is allowed to vary on either side of the cutoff. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses and are clustered on the running variable.
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Figure 2.3: Effect of Registry Extension on Continued Registry
Notes: The dependent variable is whether the offender was registered on November 13, 2012. The running variable
is the offender’s estimated registry date. The vertical line denotes the law’s effective date. Local averages are for 60
day bins. Figure 3b includes out-of-sample evidence on continued registry status of the groups of offenders who had
been registered for 10 years and 13 years as of November 13, 2012. For these two groups, I treat November 13, 2002,
and November 13, 1999 (respectively) as “cutoffs” and only graph the would-be “registry extended” group.
Importantly, omitting this group does not affect the main results, indicating that
these offenders do not drive the results.11
2.5.2 Effect of registry extension on continued sex offender registry status
Before exploring whether there is a discontinuity in recidivism at the cutoff date,
I document that there is in fact a significant discontinuity in continued registry at
the cutoff. Offenders in the “registry extended” group are 36.7 percentage points
more likely to remain on the registry until at least 2012, but, again, this is likely to
be understated for the period over which the outcomes are measured (2006-2009).
Figure 2.3 contains RDD graphs showing the effect of registry extension on con-
tinued sex offender registry status for the full 11 month bandwidth in the left panel.
11Omitting this group, the effect of registry extension on whether the offender was convicted of
any type of offense is -0.048, which is comparable to the -0.042 obtained when they are included.
As in the full sample models, this point estimate is occasionally, but not consistently statistically
significant. The effects on sex crimes and property crimes are statistically indistinguishable from
zero when this group is omitted. The coefficient for procedural crimes is -0.030 (compared to -0.023
including this group) and statistically different from zero.
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The dependent variable is whether the individual was registered in 2012. It is clear
from the graph that the discontinuity is quite stark at nearly 30 percentage points.
The local averages on the left side are not all zero because any offenders who recidi-
vated with another sex offense are still registered even if their original registry date
would have qualified them for expiration in the absence of their later convictions.
Some also did not register within 10 days of release from prison, as required by state
law.
Table 2.3: Effect of Registry Extension on Continued Registry
11 month bandwidth 6 month bandwidth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Study Group: Discontinuity
registered after 16 years
registry extended 0.283*** 0.291*** 0.289*** 0.294***
(0.040) (0.038) (0.056) (0.056)
num. of observations 2005 2005 1069 1069
Out of Sample Evidence: Continued Registry
registered after 10 years
intercept 0.842*** 1.029*** 0.846*** 0.984***
(0.024) (0.095) (0.032) (0.100)
num. of observations 888 888 463 463
registered after 13 years
intercept 0.646*** 0.668*** 0.631*** 0.369***
(0.032) (0.105) (0.046) (0.132)
num. of observations 1025 1025 545 545
controls no yes no yes
time polynomial linear linear linear linear
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Notes: The outcome variable is whether an individual was registered as a sex offender in 2012 in North Carolina.
The reported coefficients are for the variable “registry extended.” For the 10 year and 13 year samples, I estimate an
equation where the only regressor(s) is the time polynomial. I report the intercept which represents the proportion
of offenders registered at the cutoff. Control variables include race dummies, gender, age, number of pre-registry con-
victions for any type of offense and sex offenses, number of previous incarcerations and total time spent incarcerated
before registry. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered on the running variable.
Table 2.3 contains results indicating the effect of registry extension on continued
registry obtained by estimating equation 1 using ordinary least squares. Reported
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coefficients are for the variable “registry extended” and indicate the difference in the
probability that an offender was registered in 2012 at the cutoff. Estimates range
from 0.283 to 0.294; all are significant on the 1% level. Importantly, the results
change little based on bandwidth or the inclusion of controls, indicating that being
in the “registry extended” group is uncorrelated with observable and (hopefully)
unobservable factors that may affect registry in 2012.
Only 55% of offenders in the registry extended group were still registered in 2012
(offenders’ 16th year of registry); this likely understates the proportion of offenders
who were registered during their 10th to 13th year of registry, the time over which
outcomes are measured. To quantify how much the discontinuity is understated, I
use a sample of offenders released later than my main sample group to provide “out
of sample” evidence to suggest the magnitude of the discontinuity at the time of
registry expiration and during the period over which the outcomes are measured.
Obtaining an estimate of the discontinuity in registry at the time over which the
outcomes are measured is important for understanding the true magnitude of the
treatment and allows for more accurate interpretation of results on recidivism. I do
so by estimating the following equation:
Registryi = α + β1f(RegistryDatei) + ui (2.2)
Using ordinary least squares, I estimate this model using 2 separate samples of
offenders: those who had been registered between 10 and 11 years and between
13 and 14 years as of November 13, 2012.12 In order to generate a comparable
figure and estimates, I treat November 12, 2002, and November 12, 1999, as registry
extension cutoffs; I estimate models and generate figures using the would-be “registry
12This should be analogous to the “registry extended” group in the main models.
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extended” group according to those cutoffs. The coefficient β0 will therefore denote
the likelihood of registry at the would-be cutoff for those groups, and controlling for
the running variable will allow for simple graphical comparison.
The lower panel of Figure 2.3 replicates the in-sample first stage graph (solid line)
and displays the out-of-sample evidence (dashed line for the 10 year sample; dashed
and dotted line for the 13 year sample). Results for the 10 year and 13 year samples
represent likely bounds of the true first stage. Visually, this evidence suggests that
the discontinuity in registry may have been between 40 and 60 percentage points
during the 10th to 13th year after initial registry (the period for which recidivism is
measured).
The second part of Table 2.3 contains estimates for the 10 year and 13 year
samples. The estimated intercept from these models represents the proportion of
offenders who are registered at the cutoff. Subtracting 0.245 (the proportion of
offenders registered just before the cutoff in the main sample) from this coefficient
will give us estimates of the suggested 10 year and 13 year discontinuities. The
10 year intercept is at least 84% across models, suggesting a discontinuity of 59.5
percentage points. Estimates of the 13 year intercept are mostly near 65%, suggesting
a discontinuity of around 40.5 percentage points. The discontinuity in registry for the
sample group during the time over which outcomes are measured is likely somewhere
between 40 and 60 percentage points. In order to recover a local average treatment
effect from the reduced form results presented, this discontinuity implies that we
would have to approximately double the estimates.
2.5.3 Effect of registry extension on recidivism
Figure 2.4 contains RDD figures and indicates that registry extension has no
effect on sex offense recidivism. There is no visual evidence of a discontinuity in
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recidivist sex offenses. I report corresponding RDD findings in Table 2.4. I estimate
equation 2.1 using OLS, and robust standard errors are clustered on the running
variable. RDD estimates are obtained using a linear function of the running variable
and with and without covariates. For sex offenses, the estimates range from -0.0003
to -0.0020, indicating that offenders in the “registry extended” group are less than a
quarter of a percentage point less likely to be convicted of a sex crime at the cutoff,
and none of these estimates are statistically distinguishable from zero. The point
estimate for the 11 month bandwidth with controls is -0.0003, indicating a reduction
of 1.88%. Because reducing sex offenses is a stated goal of sex offender registries, the
lack of evidence of their effectiveness at reducing sex crimes is important for policy
analysis.
In Figure 2.4, recidivism of any type exhibits a discontinuity at the cutoff. The
discontinuity appears to be around 5 percentage points. Point estimates in Table 2.4
indicate that the registry extension makes offenders between 2.7 and 5.8 percentage
points less likely to be convicted of an offense. This result is not sufficiently precise
to rule out that point estimates are statistically different from zero, but they are all
negative and rule out an increase of over 2.1 percentage points with 95% confidence.
Results for all crime types combined indicate that there may be a decrease in
recidivism for any type of crime, but that decrease is not driven by sex offenses. To
elucidate this finding, I look for effects on various other types of crimes.
Recidivist infractions related to court procedures is the only type of recidivism
that exhibits a statistically significant decrease at the cutoff. In Figure 2.4, the RDD
graph for this type of recidivism is in the bottom, right panel. This figure presents
visually compelling evidence that there is a decrease in this type of recidivism due to
the registry extension. The last row of Table 2.4 contains estimates for this outcome
variable; these results indicate that registry extension may cause around a .5 to 3
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Figure 2.4: Effect of Registry Extension on Recidivism
Notes: Recidivism is calculated for the 3 years after registry expiration or extension. The running variable is the
offender’s estimated registry date. The vertical line denotes the law’s effective date. Local averages are for 60 day
bins.
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Table 2.4: Effect of Registry Extension on Recidivism
11 month bandwidth 6 month bandwidth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
sex crime: whether offender recidivated
registry extended -0.0009 -0.0003 -0.0020 -0.0005
(0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015)
any crime type: whether offender recidivated
registry extended -0.0419 -0.0269 -0.0583 -0.0392
(0.031) (0.029) (0.042) (0.039)
violent offenses: whether offender recidivated
registry extended -0.0052 -0.0015 -0.0183 -0.0129
(0.016) (0.015) (0.022) (0.021)
property offenses: whether offender recidivated
registry extended 0.0035 0.0078 0.0040 0.0073
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)
drug and alcohol offenses: whether offender recidivated
registry extended 0.0032 0.0096 -0.0148 -0.0064
(0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.021)
procedural offenses: whether offender recidivated
registry extended -0.0231* -0.0213* -0.0044 -0.0033
(0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.018)
num. of observations 2005 2005 1069 1069
covariates no yes no yes
time polynomial linear linear linear linear
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Notes: Each value in the table is generated by a separate regression. The reported coefficients are for the variable
“registry extended.” Recidivism measures are computed for the 3 years after the offender’s registry expiration date
or extension. Control variables include race dummies, gender, age, number of pre-registry convictions for any type
of offense and sex offenses, number of previous incarcerations and total time spent incarcerated before registry. The
running variable is the estimated registry date. The time polynomial is allowed to vary on either side of the cutoff.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered on the running variable.
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percentage point decrease in such recidivism. The estimates are all negative across
all specifications and are not statistically different from each other, but are only
statistically different from zero in the models for the 11 month bandwidth.
In contrast, there is no evidence that violent offenses, property offenses, or drug
and alcohol offenses are affected by the registry extension. Visually, there is little
evidence of an effect on any of these types of crimes in Figure 2.4. Generally, point
estimates for violent crimes in Table 2.4 are small, negative and not statistically
different from zero. The effect on property crimes is small, positive, and statistically
insignificant. If registries affect offenders primarily by limiting their employment
options, we might expect to see an increase in property crimes for those offenders
whose registry was extended. I find no strong evidence of this. For drug and alcohol
crimes, point estimates are also statistically indistinguishable from zero, but they
vary in sign and magnitude.
2.5.4 Test for differential attrition
Because I use recidivism data from only North Carolina, it is important to know
whether registry extension is likely to be correlated with leaving the state. If the
worst offenders were to leave the state as a result of remaining on the registry,
then the estimates might overstate the decrease in recidivism caused by the registry.
Because many states require immigrant offenders from other states to register as sex
offenders regardless of whether their duty to register in the state of conviction has
expired, one might worry that offenders in the “registry expired” group were more
likely to stay in North Carolina.
To address whether or not this was likely to be the case, I searched the National
Sex Offender Public Website for a subset offenders to determine if one group or the
other is more likely to be registered out of state. The search tool returns all records
27
from state registries for offenders with the entered name and similar names. For
efficiency, I only looked up a subset of names near the cutoff that are relatively less
common using an index of name uniqueness to determine which offenders should
be omitted. This index was based on the Social Security Administration’s lists
of common baby names by decade and the US Census Bureau’s data on surname
frequency.13
Table 2.5 summarizes the results. I looked up a total of 338 offenders (out of
2005), of whom 167 (approximately half) came from the “registry expired” group.
Critically, the number of offenders who are registered in another state is almost
equal across registry types at around 9%. This suggests that there is no evidence of
differential attrition from the sample.
Table 2.5: Test for Differential Attrition
registry expired registry extended
offender current status:
registered in North Carolina 13.17% 35.67%
registered in another state 8.98% 8.19%
not registered anywhere 67.07% 43.27%
number checked 167 171
Notes: The subsample of offenders for this test was selected from those closest to the cutoff and restricted using a
name uniqueness index. Offender current status was confirmed using the National Sex Offender Public Website.
13I used the SSA’s 200 most common baby name lists from the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and 1980s
(United States Social Security Administration, 2013) because most offenders were born during that
time. I calculated the proportion of babies born during those decades given these common names.
I converted the Census Bureau’s count of all surnames occurring at least 100 times (in the 2000
Decennial Census, United States Census Bureau, 2013) to a percent of the population, and then I
multiplied the first name percent by the last name percent to get a rough probability of having each
name. I eliminated all names from the list that occurred more than .15 times for every 1 million
people. For example, the names “Roger Brown” (25 records nationally) and “David Holmes” (19
records nationally) have index values just above this threshold and were excluded from the selection
for lookup.
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2.6 Discussion
In this study I analyze the effect of extending the registry period for sex offenders
on recidivism. I do so using a natural experiment in which the state of North Carolina
purged offenders from the registry when they had been registered for 10 years, but
then abruptly stopped this practice. The offenders who had originally registered just
before December 1, 1996, saw their registration expire in 2006, while those registered
just after did not. Because this cutoff was designated 10 years after the offenders
initially registered, registry extension is plausibly exogenous. I use this source of
exogenous variation to estimate regression discontinuity models to distinguish the
effect of being on the registry from confounding factors.
Importantly, I find no evidence that registry extension has the intended effect of
reducing sex crime recidivism. I also find little evidence in favor of a major criticism
of sex offender registries that sex offenders will commit property crimes because
their labor market outcomes are limited by formal restrictions and social stigma.
I find that the only type of crime that is affected by registry extension is a type
that has little effect on public safety - regulation-based crimes, such as parole revo-
cations, possession of a firearm by a felon, and obstructing justice. Any reduction is
likely due to the additional supervision that continued registry imposes on offenders.
Registrants are required to keep the local authorities up to date on their address,
and may be more aware of other regulations due to the additional supervision that
they receive in doing so.
Overall, these results suggest that registries may deter criminals from committing
infractions, but not sex offenses as intended. They also suggest that the deterrent
effects may be isolated to lower priority types of crimes. Registries are costly for law
enforcement to operate, and policy-makers must decide whether potentially reducing
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recidivism in these contexts sufficiently justifies long registry periods. The major
benefits to law enforcement are not likely in increases in public safety, but instead
in stemming the flow of former criminals back into the penal system. If agencies do
determine that this is an appropriate objective, then my results suggest that they
would reap the largest benefits by working to increase the salience of sex offender
supervision.
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3. THE EFFECT OF HOUSING VOUCHERS ON CRIME: EVIDENCE FROM
A LOTTERY
3.1 Introduction
The U.S. government provided $ 16.6 billion in rent subsidies to disadvantaged
families through the Housing Choice Voucher Program in 2013 (Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities, 2014). Historically the U.S. government provided housing directly
to families in the form of housing projects, though there has been a shift in the
last few decades toward housing voucher programs. The federally-funded Housing
Choice Voucher Program provides rent support to about 2.1 million households living
in non-government housing, which is around 43% of all households receiving federal
rental assistance (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2012). The program, often
simply called “Section 8, is designed to allow participants to reside in areas previously
unaffordable and provide an in-kind transfer to low-income families and individuals.
The program is means-tested, and participating families receive a rent subsidy that
is paid directly to their landlords.
In this paper, we examine the effect of Section 8 vouchers on crime. Vouchers
could affect crime through two major channels: income transfer effects and neigh-
borhood effects. Income transfers can relieve financial pressures that could otherwise
cause recipients to seek illicit income. Alternatively, income transfers could also pro-
vide the funds or leisure time necessary to participate in illegal activities. Voucher
receipt could also affect criminal involvement by changing neighborhood influences.
Moving to a better neighborhood could reduce crime via positive peer effects or social
norms, or it could increase crime by providing easier and wealthier targets.1
1Others have used the Gatreux Program (a precursor of MTO, Popkin, Rosenbaum, and Meaden,
1993), random assignment into public housing (Oreopoulos, 2003) or Hurricane Katrina (Hussey,
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Understanding the causal effects of housing mobility programs is challenging be-
cause individuals select to participate in voucher programs. Eligible families that opt
to use vouchers may also take other steps to better their lives, creating a substan-
tial source of selection bias. Many studies of voucher programs rely on randomized
social experiments, such as the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) experiment. Often,
Section 8 housing vouchers are given out via randomized lottery because it is not
an entitlement program and there are usually more applicants than vouchers. Some
papers rely on this random variation in voucher allocation for identification.
In this paper, we exploit the exogenous variation in randomized waitlist positions
assigned using a lottery in order to identify the causal effects of Section 8 vouchers
on arrests of adult household heads. The lottery we study was administered by the
housing authority of the City of Houston. We link the voucher recipients to arrest
records from the Houston Police Department (HPD) to determine whether voucher
receipt has an effect on arrests for various types of crimes. We estimate the effects
using intent-to-treat models identified using the timing of voucher receipt, which is
determined by the randomized lottery.
To support the assumption that waitlist positions are indeed random and that
there are no differences between those who lease-up with a voucher earlier and those
who lease-up later, we perform empirical tests for differences in pre-lottery char-
acteristics of applicants. The relationships between pre-lottery characteristics and
waitlist positions are consistent with waitlist randomization and that the type of in-
dividuals who lease-up at different times are no different. Because MTO studies have
consistently found asymmetric effects by gender (Katz, Kling, and Liebman, 2001;
Clampet-Lundquist, Edin, Kling, and Duncan, 2011; Jacob, Kapustin, and Ludwig,
2014; Ludwig and Kling, 2007; Kling, Ludwig, and Katz, 2005; Kling, Liebman, and
Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy, and Pacurar, 2011; Kirk, 2012) to study mobility and crime.
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Katz, 2007), we also test for effects of the voucher within gender subgroups.
Results indicate that some criminal outcomes actually increase while others re-
main unchanged due to voucher receipt. We find that the probability of being ar-
rested for a violent offense in a quarter increases by 0.066 percentage points (a nearly
95% increase) and that the effect is primarily driven by men. Our results highlight
an unintended consequence of the Section 8 Housing Voucher Program an increase
in arrests for violent crime. We attribute this increase to the additional funds and
leisure time available to voucher recipients that can be used to commit crimes; both
of these mechanisms have been shown to increase illegal activity previously (Dobkin
and Puller, 2007; Riddell and Riddell, 2006; Foley, 2011; Lin, 2008).
Our contribution to the literature is three-fold. The primary contribution is that
we are the first to consider the effect of housing vouchers on criminal outcomes for
adult recipients using a randomized lottery.2 We join an extensive crime literature
produced by MTO, which, with the exception of Ludwig and Kling (2007) who
studied the contagion effects of neighborhood crime on both adults and juveniles,
primarily focuses on outcomes for youth whose families received vouchers. While
most of these studies have found that MTO caused positive or neutral effects for
female youth, their findings for male youth have been surprisingly negative (Clampet-
Lundquist, Edin, Kling, and Duncan, 2011; Kling, Ludwig, and Katz, 2005; Sciandra,
Sanbonmatsu, Duncan, Gennetian, Katz, Kessler, Kling, and Ludwig, 2013; Zuberi,
2012). The only exception is Katz, Kling, and Liebman (2001), who shows that male
youth have less behavior problems after moving through MTO. The effect of Section 8
voucher receipt on adult criminal outcomes is yet to be documented although Jacob,
2Leech (2013) uses NLSY data to study the relationship between voucher receipt and self-
reported violent altercations for young adult heads of household receiving vouchers. She suggests
that selection bias is a methodological shortcoming of her study. She finds that voucher receipt is
associated with reduced violent altercations, but that this association is not present in the subsample
of black recipients.
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Kapustin, and Ludwig (2014) use a lottery-based identification strategy to show that
there is no effect on arrest rates of juveniles whose families received vouchers (among
other outcomes).
Secondly, we study the impact of residential mobility in the context of the Sec-
tion 8 voucher program which accounts for a significant portion of federal housing
assistance (43% according to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (2012)).
Hence, our results are relevant for predicting the impact of Section 8 in other con-
texts. Again, we are the first to consider the effects of Section 8 voucher receipt on
adult criminal outcomes using a lottery, so the policy implications of our results are
quite significant.
Finally, our results speak to the relative impact of neighborhood and income
effects that arise due to voucher receipt. We provide new evidence that the neigh-
borhoods into which recipients move are only slightly different from their pre-voucher
neighborhoods along demographic and economic grounds. This result is in agreement
with existing literature on Section 8 vouchers (Jacob and Ludwig, 2012; Lens, 2013)
and suggests that the effect of the income transfers maybe be the larger influence.
We also believe that income transfers are the primary mechanism because the in-
crease in crimes that we detect is in line with the negative outcomes found in the
previous literature on government cash transfer programs (Dobkin and Puller, 2007;
Kenkel, Schmeiser, and Urban, 2014; Riddell and Riddell, 2006; Evans and Moore,
2011; Foley, 2011).
Additional income can also affect crime by altering recipients employment deci-
sions in that it may afford recipients the opportunity to take additional leisure time,
which they could use to participate in crime, among other things. Empirically, Sec-
tion 8 voucher receipt does, in fact, cause lower labor force participation rates and
earnings (Jacob and Ludwig, 2012; Carlson, Haveman, Kaplan, and Wolfe, 2012),
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and a similar effect has been detected for food stamps (Hoynes and Schanzenbach,
2012).
Overall, our study documents an unintended consequence of Section 8 housing
vouchers (an increase in arrests for violent crime for adult heads of household). The
program is the largest housing assistance program in the U.S., so this repercussion
could be quite large on a national scale. The disparity between findings for males
and females implies that large income shocks have heterogeneous effects on recipients
by gender and has policy implications for screening and oversight within the voucher
program.
3.2 Background
The Section 8 Housing Voucher program is the largest housing assistance program
in the U.S. The vouchers are federally-funded, and the U.S Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) allocates the funds to local housing authorities and
sets eligibility standards across the nation. HUD requires that participants’ incomes
fall below 80% of the median family income in the area, adjusting for family size,
and stipulates that seventy-five percent of new voucher recipients’ incomes are less
than 30% of the local median family income (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities,
2013). Voucher recipients must also be citizens or of other eligible immigration sta-
tus, and the Houston Housing Authority (HHA) can deny eligibility for drug-related
criminal activity (Houston Housing Authority, 2013). Local housing authorities sub-
mit the subsidies directly to the recipients’ new landlords. Continued eligibility is
assessed annually, and recipients are allowed to use their vouchers in any U.S. city
with the Housing Choice Voucher Program in place, although, according to HHA,
less than 10% of voucher recipients move to a different city.
HHA serves around 60,000 Houstonians, over 80% of whom are participants in
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Figure 3.1: Lottery and Voucher Service Processes
the Housing Choice Voucher Program. HHA accepted voucher applications from
December 11, 2006, to December 27, 2006, and received over 29,000 applications.
All applicants were assigned a lottery number regardless of whether they met the
eligibility criteria. Vouchers were then extended to the applicants as the funding
became available starting with the lowest lottery numbers. The lottery and voucher
service processes are outlined in Figure 3.1. Once an applicant’s wait-list position was
reached, he or she received a voucher screening packet from HHA and the verification
process began. After their eligibility was verified, families were required to sign a
lease in a Section 8 approved community in order to participate in the program.
The average time between HHA sending the initial packet and the recipient leasing
up with the voucher was 6 months. Because the speed of this process varied by
applicant, the vouchers were not issued in perfect sequential order.3
3In addition, some lottery numbers were called too far out of order for this to be the case. HHA
says that there were no priority groups in the lottery, and there are no common characteristics of
these applicants who were called out of sequence. However, because we use the assigned lottery num-
ber to predict voucher service, our estimates should be unbiased by the occasional non-sequential
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Figure 3.2: Heatmaps of Application and Voucher Use Addresses
(a) Distribution of application addresses (b) Distribution of voucher use addresses
Notes: The heatmaps are created in ArcMap using a point density operation that creates a grid over the map and
then counts the number of address points within each grid cell. The outline indicates the Houston Police Department
police beats.
The first vouchers were issued in July 2007. However, the majority of vouchers
were serviced starting in 2009, and HHA had sent screening packets to almost all the
lottery numbers by October 2012. Overall, take-up rate was about 23%. The low
take up is a result of applicants dropping out at every step of the voucher service
process. Based on the last known application statuses, close to 60% of the verification
packets were not returned to HHA by the families. 2.5% of the applicants were found
to be ineligible after verification and about 4% of them were unable to sign a lease
in time, and the voucher expired.
We geocode the addresses provided on the applications and the addresses of
current residents in order to describe the pre and post lottery neighborhoods of
voucher recipients. Figure 3.2 shows the density of these two types of addresses
across the city using heat maps, and contains the boundaries of HPDs police beats.4
calling of lottery numbers.
4The heat maps are created in ArcMap using a point density operation that creates a grid over
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The distribution of addresses indicates that the voucher-users are not moving to
different parts of the city on the whole. Changes in neighborhood (defined as Census
tract and police division) experienced by the voucher recipients are documented in
Table 3.1. Around 14% of voucher recipients did not move addresses and instead used
the voucher at their address at the time of application; nearly 30% stayed in the same
Census Tract. The median distance moved is 3.01 miles and the voucher paid $628
toward rent every month. Only 3.4% of these recipients were living in public housing
at the time of application. Around 54% of recipients used their vouchers to live at
addresses at which no other voucher recipients from this program live; over 80% live
in housing complexes with 6 or less participating households. Differences between the
neighborhoods before and after the lottery are listed in the second part of the table.
We report median rent in 2012 from the American Community Survey, and we see
that voucher recipients move to Census Tracts with only $40 higher monthly median
rent. We report demographics and socioeconomic characteristics of the census tracts
from the 2010 census and crime rates from 2000-2005 for the police divisions. The
post-lottery neighborhoods are somewhat better off in terms of parameters such as
unemployment rate, household income, poverty rate and crime rates.
These differences in neighborhoods are minimal; for example, voucher use neigh-
borhoods had on average 2.1 less crimes per year per 1000 residents, which is a 1.5
percent improvement. As a result, we believe that any impact of the vouchers in this
context can be most reasonably attributed to the income shock induced by an annual
rent subsidy of more than $7,500 on average. Additional income, itself, can be spent
on things that can increase or decrease the likelihood of arrest. It could also alleviate
financial pressures, which would reduce the recipients’ motivations to be involved in
crime that can lead to financial gain, such as selling illegal drugs or theft. The net
the map and then counts the number of address points within each grid cell.
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Table 3.1: Comparison of Application and Voucher use Addresses for Takers
Voucher Use Characteristics Mean (s.d.)
Distance moved in miles 4.7 (5.5)
Rent paid by voucher 628 (253)
Rent paid by resident 205 (203)
Percent living in public housing before 3.4 (0.2)
Observations 1693
Neighborhood Characteristics Application Address Voucher Use Address Difference
Census Tract Characteristics
Median age 31.7 (4.8) 30.7 (4.5) -1.0*** (0.2)
Percent over 18 years 70.7 (5.0) 69.7 (4.8) -1.0*** (0.2)
Percent male 48.0 (3.1) 47.9 (3.0) -0.1 (0.1)
Percent white 26.5 (18.0) 30.1 (17.9) 3.6*** (0.6)
Percent black 52.5 (27.1) 47.1 (26.4) -5.4*** (0.9)
Percent Hispanic 35.4 (21.4) 37.9 (21.0) 2.5*** (0.7)
Median rent 797 (168) 836 (181) 39*** (6)
Percent housing occupied 86.9 (7.3) 87.7 (7.0) 0.8*** (0.2)
Percent unemployment 12.3 (5.6) 11.1 (5.4) -1.2*** (0.2)
Median household income 33213 (12329) 35727 (13505) 2514*** (444)
Median family income 37637 (14950) 39446 (14791) 1809*** (511)
Percent below poverty 34.6 (15.9) 32 (16.0) -2.6*** (0.5)
Observations 1693 1693
Police Division Characteristics (Annual rates per 1000 population)
Crime rate 135.9 (23.3) 133.8 (25) -2.1** (0.8)
Murder rate 0.2 (0.0) 0.2 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0)
Violent crime rate 13.5 (3.0) 13.2 (3.4) -0.3*** (0.1)
Property crime rate 58.9 (10.8) 58.5 (11.0) -0.4 (0.4)
Observations 1389 1176
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Notes: Statistics are shown for voucher recipients for whom both pre and post-lottery addresses were available and
geocodable. Crime rates at the police division level are from 2000 to 2005.
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effect is ambiguous, and the question will ultimately have to be answered empirically.
The theoretical implications of an in-kind transfer on labor decisions are similarly
ambiguous because they depend on the shape of each recipient’s indifference curves.
However, researchers find that vouchers reduce earnings and labor force participation
(Jacob and Ludwig, 2012). Like additional income, additional leisure time can be
put toward things that either increase or decrease the likelihood of arrest.
Given that much of the existing literature has examined MTO, it is important
to highlight the differences between the two housing programs. MTO researchers
recruited only public housing residents to participate and split them into 3 groups.
The first (the “MTO experimental group”) received vouchers and was only allowed
to use them in census tracts with low poverty rates. The second was simply given
vouchers and called the “Section 8 experimental group” because their treatment
was similar to Section 8. The third was a control. The neighborhoods into which
MTO experimental families moved were notably different from the ones that they
left (Katz, Kling, and Liebman, 2001; Kling, Ludwig, and Katz, 2005). The MTO
Section 8 experimental group moved to areas more like their neighborhoods of ori-
gin than the MTO experimental group (Kling, Ludwig, and Katz, 2005), although
there was some improvement. Similar to findings for the MTO Section 8 group and
Jacob and Ludwig’s findings (2012), we find that Census tract characteristics of new
neighborhoods are slightly improved, but the changes are not large. Additionally,
the neighborhood changes we detect are smaller in relative terms than those found
in MTO studies for the MTO experimental group. For example, HHA voucher recip-
ients moved to neighborhoods with a 7.6% lower average poverty rate, while MTO
experimental group participants moved to neighborhoods with a 26% lower average
poverty rate (Kling, Liebman, and Katz, 2007).
MTO’s driving mechanisms were also different because it targeted families living
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in public housing. MTO required the families to move and provided little, if any,
additional financial gains directly for the families. Section 8, on the other hand,
provides a substantial income transfer, and HUD does not allow local housing au-
thorities to place restrictions on neighborhoods in which recipients can use vouchers.
While we do not have any information on the Section 8 participants’ reasons for
applying for the program, it is well documented that MTO families cite a desire to
get away from gangs and drugs as the main reason for volunteering (e.g. Kling, Lud-
wig, and Katz, 2005). This concern is likely addressed by the neighborhood change
facilitated by MTO, but Section 8 voucher receipt may have little effect on this. The
populations opting into these two programs are also likely to be quite different due
to incongruous motivations.
3.3 Data
The Houston Housing Authority provided us with information on the voucher ap-
plicants (Houston Housing Authority, 2014). These confidential data include lottery
numbers, the number of bedrooms needed (calculated based on family size), the date
on which HHA sent the voucher screening packet and the move-in date for voucher
recipients. The data also include name and birthdate, which we use to match the
HHA data to arrest records. They also provided additional, more detailed informa-
tion on the set of applicants who are current participants in Housing Choice Voucher
Program. For this group, we also know their race and homeless status at the time
of admission.
HHA assigned lottery numbers up to 29,327, but we limit our sample to those
living in Houston at the time of application. Additionally, there are a small number
of duplicate applicants; we assign them their lowest lottery number. We also drop
applicants with lottery numbers over 24,000 because the take up rate is much lower
41
among the later lottery numbers indicating a probable change in the voucher service
process after that point.
Additionally, we restrict our analysis to those applicants who eventually leased-up
with a voucher. Estimates from the sample unconditional on take-up are of simi-
lar magnitudes as those from the sample conditional on take-up, but are measured
imprecisely given the relatively low take-up rates in Houston. The take-up rate is
only 23%, which is low relative to the 69% national average estimated by Finkel and
Buron (2001). We also perform empirical tests, detailed in the following section, to
support the assumption that the population of early movers is no different from that
of late movers. The resulting sample size is 4,510.
Treatment is leasing-up using a voucher. Intuitively, the “voucher service quarter”
(intent-to-treat) is the quarter during which the applicant would have leased-up
according to lottery number. On average, recipients take approximately 6 months to
complete the screening process and actually relocate using the voucher. We determine
whether the individual has been sent a screening packet by a given quarter based on
his or her lottery number relative to the numbers called by that point.5 Lagging this
by two quarters gives us the “voucher service” quarter.
Table 3.2 reports pre-lottery descriptive statistics. We report them for the popu-
lation of voucher-users, and we show them separately by low and high lottery num-
bers (applicants whose vouchers were serviced earliest and those applicants whose
vouchers were serviced latest) to show similarity between these groups prior to the
lottery. If these groups are different on important measures, it could indicate that
5Since the lottery numbers were not called in perfect sequential order, we cannot identify the
range of lottery numbers simply using the smallest and largest lottery number called in a quarter.
Additionally, for approximately 5,000 applicants, there is no recorded screening packet issue date.
As a workaround, within each quarter from 2007 to 2011, we take the lottery number at the 75th
percentile to be the last number called in that quarter. We assign the next lottery number as the
first number called in the subsequent quarter.
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HHA gave preference to some groups in lottery number assignment or that the type
of individual who leased-up with a voucher changed over time.
The average voucher recipient was around 35 years old at the time of applica-
tion and required just over two bedrooms (indicating that the average family size
was between 2 and 6, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2001).
Around 94% of recipients are black, and using 2012 voting records from the Harris
County Tax Assessor’s office, we estimate that nearly 90% of applicants are female.6
Less than 1% of recipients were homeless at the time of application. The number
of observations varies for race and homeless status because they are only available
for current HHA voucher recipients. There is only one statistically significant differ-
ence between the high and low lottery numbers on any of these measures (number
of bedrooms required), and it is not economically significant.
We match the HHA data to arrest records provided by the Houston Police De-
partment (HPD). The arrest records are reported at the time of booking and include
information on the offense as well as the arrestee’s name, birthdate and reported
home address (Houston Police Department, 2012). We match the HHA and HPD
data using name and birthdate, and we perform secondary matches using the Leven-
shtein distance and soundex code of each name for unmatched records.7 The arrest
records range from January 1990 to November 2011,8 and we use the matched arrest
records to create measures of criminal activity in the period before the lottery and
6We calculate the percentage of Harris County voters whose reported gender is “male” for each
unique first name in the list of registered voters. If there are more than 4 individuals with a given
name, and 70% or more are listed as males, the name is assigned the gender “male.” If 30% or
less are listed as male, we classify the name as “female.” Applicants with unmatched or ambiguous
names are omitted from subgroup analysis.
7For the arrest records that are unmatched by name and birthdate, we calculate the Levenshtein
distance for the first and last names, if the sum of the Levenshtein distances is less than 3, conditional
on an exact birthdate match, we accept the match. For the records that are still unmatched, we
perform an exact soundex code match.
8The Houston Police Department has denied our requests for additional data, so we are not able
to extend the panel further into the post-lottery period.
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a quarterly panel of arrests for the study period after voucher service commenced
(from quarter 1 of 2007 to quarter 3 of 2011).
We consider arrests of any type and specifically categorize violent offenses, drug
offenses and financially-motivated offenses.9 We measure arrests as a binary indi-
cator for whether the recipient was arrested. The pre-lottery crime measures are
constructed for the 5 years prior to the lottery, and we create an additional binary
indicator for whether the applicant was arrested at least once between 1990 and
2006. Around 20% of applicants were arrested during that 16 year period, and ap-
proximately 9% of applicants had been arrested in the 5 years prior to the lottery.
There are no statistically significant differences between high and low lottery number
individuals.
Using the geocoded application addresses, we find that voucher recipients lived in
census tracts with around 51% black residents, and around 36% Hispanic residents.
The mean unemployment rate was around 12% and the mean of median family in-
come was just approximately $34,000. The mean poverty rate was quite high at
over 30%. Voucher recipients with higher lottery numbers lived in census tracts
with slightly higher unemployment rates and slightly lower poverty rates. Voucher
recipients lived in police divisions with an annual average of 135 crimes per 1000
residents. On average, nearly 60 of these crimes were property crimes and only were
13 were violent. Recipients with higher lottery numbers lived in neighborhoods with
1.1 more crimes per year per 1000 residents, a marginal difference considering the av-
erage crime rate. Although some of these difference are statistically significant, none
of them are economically significant. The similarity between these groups indicates
that pre-lottery characteristics are distributed randomly across lottery numbers and
suggests that the lottery was in fact random.
9A complete list of offenses and crime categories are provided in Appendix B.1
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In Table 3.3, we report post-lottery descriptive statistics. The purpose of this
table is to preview results in a cross-sectional manner. We show measures of pro-
gram take-up (whether the individual’s voucher has been serviced and whether he
or she has leased-up by a quarter) as well as all of the arrest outcomes averaged
over person-quarters (from quarter 1 of 2010 to quarter 3 of 2011). Statistics are
restricted to the last year of the panel, when vouchers for the low lottery numbers
had mostly been serviced, but it was not so for the high lottery numbers. Specifi-
cally, for individuals with lower lottery numbers (below the median) their vouchers
had been serviced for, on average, 89% of person-quarters. Conversely, the vouchers
of those with high numbers had been serviced for around 17% of person-quarters
during this period. Lease-up follows a similar pattern where low lottery numbers are
nearly 70 percentage points more likely to have leased up during a person-quarter.
The post-lottery statistics for the outcomes probability of arrest in a person-quarter
for different crime categories indicate that recipients with low lottery numbers are
significantly more likely to be arrested for crimes of any type and violent crimes in
this period.
3.4 Identification and Methods
In this study, we identify the effect of housing vouchers on criminal involvement
using a lottery. The lottery randomized the order of the waitlist from which appli-
cants were called for voucher service and actual voucher receipt. This randomization
allows us to identify the causal effects of voucher receipt. Because the random vari-
ation we exploit for identification is in timing, we analyze criminal outcomes using
a quarterly panel of arrests using pooled cross-sectional models.
Because we consider the group of applicants who eventually lease-up with a
voucher, our identifying assumption is that timing of voucher receipt among those
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who eventually received the voucher was exogenous. That is, we assume that indi-
viduals who lease up later with a voucher had similar propensities to commit crime
as those who leased up earlier. We condition on lease-up because the take-up rate is
particularly low for this lottery, resulting in imprecise estimates for the entire sam-
ple. Because take-up rates are consistent across time, we believe that the early and
later leasers are no different, and we show results from additional empirical tests to
support this in the following section.
Before we estimate intent-to-treat effects of the vouchers, we first examine evi-
dence on whether the randomization was properly implemented and whether early
movers are different from late movers. We test this empirically by examining the ex-
tent to which demographic and criminal history variables are correlated with lottery
number or voucher service quarter. We represent this graphically by simply plotting
these characteristics against lottery number and estimate it empirically according to
the following equation:
Controli = α + βV oucherOrderi + ui (3.1)
In the above equation, V oucherOrderi is either the randomized lottery number as-
signed to applicant i or his/her voucher service quarter (where the first quarter of
2007 is indexed to one). We test each applicant’s age at the time of lottery, num-
ber of bedrooms, and the set of criminal history variables: whether (and how many
times) the applicant was arrested in the 5 years prior for any type of offense, a
violent offense, a drug offense, or a financially-motivated offense, and whether the
applicant was ever arrested between 1990 and 2006. For the applicants who are
current residents, we also look for correlations in race and homelessness status at
time of admission, and gender. Similarly, for the applicants whose addresses were
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geocoded successfully, we check for a relationship between voucher service order and
neighborhood characteristics prior to the lottery.
To estimate the impact of Section 8 vouchers on arrests, we estimate the intent-
to-treat effect of voucher service. We estimate regressions of the following form:
Outcomeit = ρ+ piPostV oucherServiceit + ΨXi + φt + it (3.2)
In the above equation, PostV oucherServiceit is a dummy variable equal to one if
individual i’s voucher has been serviced by quarter t. The results should be inter-
preted as the effects of potential voucher use based on lottery number, and can be
reweighted by the first stage to recover a local average treatment effect. To estimate
this first stage, we use an indicator for whether individual i had leased up using a
voucher by quarter t, called post lease-upit, as the outcome variable.
We estimate the intent-to-treat effects using a number of recidivism outcomes:
whether an individual was arrested for crimes of any type, violent crimes, financially-
motivated crimes, and drug crimes in quarter t.
We estimate all models using quarter fixed effects as well as robust standard
errors that are clustered at the individual level. All specifications are estimated both
with and without controls for past crime (probability of arrest for the particular
crime category in the 5 years prior to the lottery), age at the time of the lottery and
a proxy for family size (number of bedrooms); this tests whether timing of voucher
service is correlated with any of the observable characteristics.10 If specifications
that do and do not include controls have similar estimates, this can be interpreted
as evidence that is consistent with randomization of timing of lease-up. We also
replicate the main results using a negative binomial model to show that results are
10We perform additional analyses controlling for application address census tract characteristics
and police division crime statistics in Appendix B.2 because they are not available for all recipients.
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not sensitive to the parametric specification imposed by the linear probability model.
We estimate all of the above models for all heads of household, as well as for men
and women, separately, because there is considerable evidence in the literature that
they respond differently to mobility programs (e.g. Clampet-Lundquist, Edin, Kling,
and Duncan, 2011; Katz, Kling, and Liebman, 2001; Kling, Ludwig, and Katz, 2005).
We also take a cue from the existing mobility literature and explore the possibility of
dynamic effects over time (Kling, Ludwig, and Katz, 2005). Specifically, we estimate
separate treatment effects for the first year after voucher service and later years of
voucher service by using two binary treatment variables. The first is equal to one
if the applicant’s voucher had been serviced within the past year, and the second
is equal to one if the applicant’s voucher had been serviced more than a year ago.
Intent-to-treat estimates are reported for this specification for the overall population
and men and women separately.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Tests of identifying assumption
Identification of the model comes from the assumption that the timing of voucher
receipt among those who eventually received the voucher was exogenous. That is, we
assume that individuals who lease up later with a voucher had similar propensities
to commit crime as those who leased up earlier. Because the timing of voucher
packet issue and therefore subsequent move into subsidized housing was determined
by a randomized lottery, this is a reasonable assumption. Nevertheless, we test this
assumption empirically in several ways.
First, we test this by showing that take-up rates did not change over time. If the
rate had changed as HHA serviced higher lottery numbers, it could indicate that late
movers may be different from the early movers. Figure 3.3 plots take-up rates over
50
Figure 3.3: Take-up Rates across Lottery Numbers
Notes: Each bubble represents the percentage of lease-up within bins of about 980 applicants.
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Figure 3.4: Take-up Rates by Gender
Notes: Each bubble represents the percentage of lease-up within bins of about 200 men and about 1000 women
respectively.
lottery numbers, and we also separate this by gender in Figure 3.4. Take-up rates do
not appear to change over the range of lottery numbers. We also test this empirically
to determine whether there is a correlation between lottery number and take-up. We
report estimates of this correlation within the figures, and there is not a statistically
significant relationship for all applicants or for males and females separately.
Second, we test for correlations between observable characteristics and both lot-
tery number and voucher service quarter. If the identifying assumption holds, we
expect to see no correlations between these measures and demographic variables or
criminal history measures. For example, if the most motivated applicants were as-
signed lower numbers through manipulation of the lottery mechanism, we would see
a negative correlation between lottery number and indicators of stability such as age,
gender, and criminal history. Conversely, if only the most stable individuals move in
later because they are less likely to move, we would see a positive correlation.
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 represent these relationships graphically for criminal history
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Figure 3.5: Test of Randomization: Pre-Lottery Characteristics of Males
(a) Criminal History
(b) Demographics
Notes: Each bubble represents the local average of the variable within bins of 53-54 men. Criminal history variables
represent the probability of arrest in the crime category between 2002 and 2006.
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Figure 3.6: Test of Randomization: Pre-Lottery Characteristics of Females
(a) Criminal History
(b) Demographics
Notes: Each bubble represents the local average of the variable within bins of 154-155 women. Criminal history
variables represent the probability of arrest in the crime category between 2002 and 2006.
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(probability of past arrests, past violent arrests, past drug arrests and past financial
arrests) and demographic (age and number of bedrooms) variables for male and fe-
male recipients, respectively. Each dot is a local average for a bin of lottery numbers.
If lottery number is truly random and the “mover” population is constant over time
in observable characteristics, the local averages should exhibit a flat relationship.
This does appear to be the case, and we take this as support for the identification
assumption.
Table 3.4 reports the results of the empirical tests. Column 1 contains the results
from 24 separate regressions using lottery number as the independent variable as
described by equation 3.1. Similarly, the regressions that generated column 2 all use
indexed voucher service quarter as the independent variable. Each row is labeled for
the covariate used as the dependent variable.
There is only one statistically significant correlation between individual charac-
teristics and voucher order. This effect is on the number of bedrooms, but it is
not economically significant. It predicts that the individual with the highest lottery
number, 24,000, would require 0.11 more bedrooms than the individual with the
lowest lottery number. There are no significant relationships between lottery num-
ber or voucher service quarter and criminal histories (perhaps the most important
determinants of future arrests).
There are a few significant correlations between voucher order and neighborhood
characteristics, but none of them are economically significant. The higher lottery
numbers come from census tracts with higher unemployment and lower poverty rates.
The higher lottery numbers also come from police divisions with higher crimes rates
overall and for violent crimes. Again, none of these differences are economically
significant. For example, if we consider 2 applicants whose vouchers were serviced 2
years apart, we would expect the later-served applicant’s original neighborhood to
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Table 3.4: Test of Randomization
Independent variables
Dependent variables Observations Lottery number/1000 Voucher service quarter
Arrested in 5 years prior to lottery 4510 0.000280 0.000327
(0.000617) (0.00127)
Violent offense in 5 years prior 4510 0.0000408 -0.000164
(0.000305) (0.000602)
Drug offense in 5 years prior 4510 0.000461 0.000907
(0.000294) (0.000596)
Financial offense in 5 years prior 4510 -0.0000880 -0.000367
(0.000292) (0.000618)
Number of arrests in 5 years prior 4510 0.000828 0.00164
(0.000897) (0.00180)
Number of violent arrests in 5 years prior 4510 0.000164 0.000111
(0.000322) (0.000640)
Number of drug arrests in 5 years prior 4510 0.000527 0.00112
(0.000373) (0.000755)
Number of financial arrests in 5 years prior 4510 0.000127 0.000167
(0.000337) (0.000721)
Arrested between 1990 and 2006 4510 0.000334 0.000505
(0.000877) (0.00179)
Age 4510 0.0109 0.0405
(0.0312) (0.0638)
Number of bedrooms 4510 0.00455** 0.00880**
(0.00211) (0.00428)
Male 3844 -0.000362 -0.00106
(0.000701) (0.00143)
Black 2612 0.000439 0.000930
(0.000711) (0.00147)
White 2612 -0.0000654 -0.0000336
(0.000548) (0.00112)
Other race 2612 -0.000373 -0.000896
(0.000469) (0.000986)
Homeless at the time of admission 2612 -0.0000769 -0.0000378
(0.000122) (0.000238)
Percent black in Census Tract 3633 0.0720 0.241*
(0.0661) (0.135)
Percent Hispanic in Census Tract 3633 0.0237 0.0105
(0.0521) (0.106)
Unemployment rate in Census Tract 3633 0.0287** 0.0758***
(0.0136) (0.0278)
Median household income in Census Tract 3633 24.34 58.21
(31.22) (63.59)
Poverty rate in Census Tract 3632 -0.0686* -0.105
(0.0392) (0.0801)
Crimes per 1k population 2938 0.148** 0.406***
(0.0652) (0.136)
Violent crimes per 1k population 2938 0.0194** 0.0537***
(0.00861) (0.0179)
Property crimes per 1k population 2938 0.0428 0.109*
(0.0291) (0.0604)
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Notes: Each cell represents a separate regression, estimating equation 3.1 with the observed covariates as the depen-
dent variables. Unit of observation is an individual. Column 1 shows the coefficients of lottery number scaled down
by 1000 and column 2 shows coefficients of the quarter in which the voucher is serviced. Robust standard errors are
presented in parentheses.
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only have 3.25 (2% of the mean) additional crimes per 1000 population annually.
Importantly, because we find an increase in violent crime arrests for recipients, if we
assume recipients from low crime neighborhoods have a lower propensity for crime,
any indication that earlier movers came from better neighborhoods would imply
that our findings are a lower bound of the true increase. As an additional check, we
also estimate the main models with and without these controls and show that the
results are invariant, indicating that timing of voucher service is orthogonal to these
characteristics.
3.5.2 Effect of voucher service on lease-up
Before examining the effect of voucher receipt on criminal outcomes, we first
document that the voucher recipients are likely to lease-up when we predict that
their vouchers were serviced. Our ability to use lottery variation to identify effects
hinges on the extent to which the lottery predicts lease-up.
Table 3.5: Relationship Between Voucher Service and Lease-Up
All Males Females
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post voucher service 0.849*** 0.849*** 0.855*** 0.845***
(0.00394) (0.00394) (0.0135) (0.00475)
Observations 85690 85690 7106 61693
Individuals 4510 4510 374 3247
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression estimating equation 3.2 with the indicator for post lease-up as
the dependent variable. Controls include age at the time of the lottery, number of bedrooms and a dummy indicating
arrest in the 5 years prior to the lottery. Unit of observation is a person-quarter. Robust standard errors, clustered
at the individual level, are presented in parentheses.
Table 3.5 contains the first stage results obtained by estimating equation 3.2 using
57
post lease-up as the outcome. The table reports the coefficient on post voucher service
from 4 separate regressions. The first two columns indicate that in 84.9% of the
person-quarters after voucher service, the voucher recipient had previously leased-
up. This coefficient is identical when we include controls in column 2, suggesting
that controls are orthogonal to post voucher service. Columns 3 and 4 indicate that
post voucher service is equally predictive of lease-up for men and women. The large
magnitude of the first stage results means that the intent-to-treat estimates will be
very close to the local average treatment effects.
3.5.3 Effect of voucher service on arrests
Table 3.6 contains the main results for the full sample of voucher recipients, as well
as for men and women separately. We estimate equation 3.2 to measure the intent-to-
treat using both ordinary least squares and a negative binomial model. We also report
the mean of each outcome variable from the year preceding the lottery (2006) for
the relevant population; we refer to it as the “pre-lottery mean.” Each row is labeled
for the outcome variable for which the results are generated. We also run models
both with and without controls and demonstrate that our results are unresponsive
to their inclusion, indicating that the timing of voucher service is unrelated to these
observable characteristics and, we expect, unobservable characteristics.11
Results show no evidence that voucher service and lease-up affect arrests for all
types of crimes combined. All of the coefficients are statistically insignificant. When
we run the models separately for males and females, we find that the coefficients are
all negative and statistically insignificant.
11Table 3.6 contains models that include controls observed for the entire sample. We also rerun
the main models using neighborhood controls only available for a subset of recipients. Results are
not statistically different from those here, the effect on violent crimes remains statistically significant
(the coefficient is 0.00381 compared to 0.00384) and coefficients change minimally between models
with and without controls. Results are in Appendix B.2.
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We also look at arrests for specific types of crimes that are likely to be affected
by voucher receipt: violent crimes, financially-motivated crimes, and drug crimes.
For the overall population, there are only statistically significant effects for violent
crimes.
Results indicate that there are considerable differences in effects across gender,
and that this overall effect on violent crime arrests is mostly driven by males. The
magnitude of said effect indicates that voucher receipt increases quarterly probability
of violent crime arrest by 0.066 percentage points. This is a nearly 95% increase.
The point estimate for males is large at 0.38 percentage points and is statistically
significant. If 100 vouchers are serviced to male applicants, the number of arrests
for violent offenses in a quarter increases from 0.13 to 0.51, which roughly translates
to 1.5 more arrests in a year. The point estimates for females are close to zero and
negative, leading us to attribute this effect primarily to males.
Negative binomial results for violent crime are similarly large and statistically
significant. For the overall population, results indicate around a 78% increase in
violent crime arrests. Similar to the linear probability models, this effect is larger
for males and statistically significant.
Drug crime arrests appear to be unaffected by voucher receipt. Effects for males
and females combined as well as separately are all statistically indistinguishable
from zero. We do find evidence that males are arrested for more drug crimes in the
6 months during which their eligibility verification and voucher process is underway
but they have not yet moved (Appendix B.3). This approximately 16% increase is
the effect of an impending income shock and can be interpreted as an announcement
effect. Financially-motivated crime arrests appear to be unaffected by voucher receipt
overall and for women. The coefficients are negative and large for men, but are not
statistically distinguishable from zero. We attribute the lack of significance to limited
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statistical power given the small sample size.
Results show little evidence that vouchers affect crime for women. For all crime
subtypes explored, the coefficients for females are orders of magnitude smaller than
those for males, and many are also small relative to the pre-lottery means.
As discussed earlier, in addition to expecting differential effects by gender, one
might also expect differential effects by how long an individual has been treated (as
Kling, Ludwig, and Katz (2005) found for juveniles). Table 3.7 contains the results
from models that allow for the effect of voucher service to vary over time. Specifically,
we estimate effects of two different intent-to-treat measures: whether the applicant’s
voucher was serviced within the last year, and whether the applicant’s voucher was
serviced more than a year ago. Because the bulk of vouchers were serviced in 2009
or later and our panel ends in 2011, most applicants were treated for just over 2
years or less. Because ordinary least squares results and negative binomial results
are so similar for the main results, we estimate these models using just ordinary least
squares for simplicity.
Panels A to D contain results from different crime categories. Column 1 reports
coefficients for the overall population, and similar to results reported previously,
there is little evidence of an overall effect for all arrests, drug arrests and financially-
motivated arrests. Among the overall population, violent arrests are slightly more
responsive to voucher receipt during the first year of voucher use, although the co-
efficients for the first year and later years are not statistically different from each
other. For females, there is little evidence that applicants’ responses to voucher ser-
vice change over treatment duration; no estimates for either duration are statistically
significant. However, results for males show that the coefficients for violent arrests
are only statistically significant for the quarters within a year of voucher service,
although they are not statistically different from the coefficients for later quarters.
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Table 3.7: Effect of Vouchers on Arrests by Time Since Voucher Service
All Males Females
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: All Arrests
Pre-Lottery Mean 0.0055 0.0174 0.0039
< 1 yr since voucher service 0.00109 0.000585 0.000123
(0.00104) (0.00421) (0.00110)
> 1 yr since voucher service -0.000584 -0.00623 -0.00109
(0.00128) (0.00665) (0.00130)
Panel B: Violent Arrests
Pre-Lottery Mean 0.0007 0.0013 0.0005
< 1 yr since voucher service 0.000728** 0.00325* -0.0000689
(0.000360) (0.00186) (0.000323)
> 1 yr since voucher service 0.000537 0.00492 -0.000119
(0.000475) (0.00324) (0.000459)
Panel C: Drug Arrests
Pre-Lottery Mean 0.0012 0.0060 0.0008
< 1 yr since voucher service 0.000372 -0.000422 0.000177
(0.000416) (0.00230) (0.000416)
> 1 yr since voucher service -0.0000339 -0.00295 -0.0000173
(0.000510) (0.00307) (0.000490)
Panel D: Financial Arrests
Pre-Lottery Mean 0.0007 0.0007 0.0006
< 1 yr since voucher service 0.000257 -0.00129 0.000522
(0.000496) (0.00162) (0.000546)
> 1 yr since voucher service -0.0000894 -0.00175 0.000243
(0.000455) (0.00146) (0.000459)
Observations 85690 7106 61693
Individuals 4510 374 3247
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Notes: Each column within a panel represents a separate regression estimating a version of equation 2 with the
independent variable split up by duration since voucher service. Pre-Lottery Mean is the mean of quarterly probability
of arrest in the crime category from the year 2006. Controls include age at the time of the lottery, number of bedrooms
and a dummy indicating arrest in the crime category in the 5 years prior to the lottery. Unit of observation is a
person-quarter. Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are presented in parentheses.
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In summary, we find that voucher receipt causes a rather large increase in violent
crime arrests for recipients, and the increase is driven by male heads of household.
We find that the vouchers have no effect on female heads of household or on other
types of crime. There does seem to be an announcement effect for drug crime that
indicates that male heads of household are arrested for more drug crimes during the
voucher processing period.
3.5.4 Test for attrition
One potential concern for our study is attrition. That is, to the extent that
individuals with low lottery numbers are more or less likely to move out of Houston
than individuals with high numbers, our results could be biased. For example, if
individuals who receive high lottery numbers are more likely to leave Houston and
commit crimes elsewhere that are not measured in our data, then our results could
overstate the increase in violent crime due to housing vouchers.
We empirically test whether applicants with lower lottery numbers and earlier
voucher service quarters are more or less likely to have stayed in Houston than those
with higher numbers and later voucher service quarters. We proxy for continued
Houston residence with whether the applicant was registered to vote in the City of
Houston in 2012 and whether he or she voted in the 2012 general election. Specifically,
we estimate an analog of equation 3.1 used in the test of randomization, to test for
a relationship between when an applicant’s voucher was serviced and whether he or
she stayed in the city.
We show the raw data in Figure 3.7; it plots voter registration and actual voting in
2012 against lottery numbers. Each dot represents a local average for a bin of about
50 males’ or about 150 females’ lottery numbers. There is no discernible correlation
between lottery number and either voting outcome. This suggests that individuals
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Figure 3.7: Test for Differential Attrition across Lottery Numbers
Notes: Each bubble represents the local percentage within bins of 53-54 men and 154-155 women respectively, of
recipients who were registered to vote and who voted in Houston in 2012.
whose numbers were called early in the sample period were no more or less likely to
be in Houston several years later than those whose numbers were called late in the
sample period.
Table 3.8 contains the results of the empirical test. In the odd columns the
dependent variable is a dummy for being registered in 2012, and in the even columns
it is a dummy for voting in 2012. There are no significant correlations between
when an applicant was served by HHA (measured by lottery number and voucher
service quarter) and the two proxies for Houston residence. We test for differential
attrition for males and females separately because the significant results discussed in
the previous section were gender specific. There is no evidence of differential attrition
for males or females.
3.6 Conclusion
In this study, we analyze whether receiving a housing voucher affects criminal
activity for low income individuals. The timing of voucher receipt was determined
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Table 3.8: Test for Differential Attrition across Lottery Numbers
All Males Females
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Registered Voted Registered Voted Registered Voted
Panel A
Lottery number/1000 0.000520 -0.0000686 0.00277 0.00235 -0.000800 -0.000137
(0.00102) (0.00103) (0.00355) (0.00356) (0.00121) (0.00123)
Panel B
Voucher service quarter 0.000521 -0.000601 0.00694 0.00508 -0.00248 -0.000885
(0.00208) (0.00211) (0.00718) (0.00733) (0.00245) (0.00251)
Observations 4510 4510 374 374 3247 3247
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Notes: Each cell represents a separate regression, estimating equation 1 with dummy indicating being registered in
2012 as the dependent variable in the odd columns and a dummy indicating having voted in 2012 as the dependent
variable in the even columns. Unit of observation is an individual. Panel A shows the coefficients for lottery number
scaled down by 1000 and Panel B shows coefficients for the voucher service quarter. Robust standard errors are
presented in parentheses.
by an individual’s position on the wait-list, which was assigned using a randomized
lottery. We use the lottery numbers to determine by when an individual’s wait-list
number was serviced and estimate intent-to-treat models to determine the effect on
arrests overall and arrests for types of crimes likely to be affected by voucher receipt.
Results indicate that voucher receipt causes a large increase in violent crime ar-
rests for male recipients. They do not, however, indicate that vouchers have an
effect on women or on other types of crime. Specifically, we find a statistically signif-
icant increase in violent crime arrests for the overall population and male recipients
alone. There are no statistically significant effects for female recipients alone. This
dichotomy in the effects for male and female housing voucher recipients is consistent
with previous research on the effect of the MTO experiment on juvenile criminal
outcomes (Kling, Ludwig, and Katz, 2005; Sciandra, Sanbonmatsu, Duncan, Gen-
netian, Katz, Kessler, Kling, and Ludwig, 2013; Zuberi, 2012; Clampet-Lundquist,
Edin, Kling, and Duncan, 2011).
Although the Housing Choice Voucher Program was designed to facilitate mo-
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bility in addition to providing an in-kind transfer to low-income individuals, we
show that the neighborhoods into which recipients move are only slightly less dis-
advantaged from their original neighborhoods. Again, this finding is consistent with
previous research (Lens, 2013). The lack of a meaningful change in neighborhood
leads us to believe that the massive income transfer provided to recipients is driving
the increase in violent crime that we detect.
Such an income transfer could work to either increase or decrease arrests for
recipients depending on how they choose to spend their additional income and how
they change their labor decisions. Based on the increase in violent crime arrests that
we detect for males we believe that males in our sample may be spending the extra
income on things that lead to violent crime such as drugs and alcohol, which is a
well-supported outcome in the government transfer literature (Dobkin and Puller,
2007; Evans and Moore, 2011; Riddell and Riddell, 2006). The violent crime arrests
in this dataset are 94% assaults (5% robberies and 1% rapes), and only 13% of them
occur at the arrestee’s home address. (Domestic violence incidences are not identified
in the arrest records, so we consider the assaults occurring at the arrestee’s home
as a measure of domestic violence.) These two characteristics lead us to believe
that the policy is having an effect on social non-domestic assaults. Because Jacob
and Ludwig (2012) show that Section 8 voucher recipients work less hours, we also
believe that additional leisure time contributes to this negative consequence as it
affords recipients more time to socialize. If that socialization also includes drugs and
alcohol, this is even more likely to be the case.
Our results suggest that housing vouchers may have unintended consequences for
some recipients. We find that if 100 males receive vouchers, we can expect at least 1.5
additional violent crime arrests a year. HHA issued vouchers to 374 males, so they
should observe at least 5.61 additional arrests per year. Based on the distribution
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of crime types, the social cost of these crimes is $59,407.60 annually. Roughly 10%
of the 2.1 million Housing Choice Voucher recipients (heads of households) are male
nationally, there could be 3,150 more crimes, costing over $33 million dollars across
the US.
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4. KEEP THE KIDS INSIDE: JUVENILE CURFEWS, BAD WEATHER, AND
URBAN GUN VIOLENCE
4.1 Introduction
Better data allow better analysis and lead to more convincing empirical results.
This has been the theme of research in many fields of economics in recent decades.
One of the biggest shifts has been from dependence on survey data to the use of
large, administrative datasets — including Unemployment Insurance data (Kling,
2006), tax records (Chetty, Friedman, Hilger, Saez, Schanzenbach, and Yagan, 2011),
and school records (Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff, 2014). The economics of crime
literature has also benefitted somewhat from improvements in data availability, but
crime data quality lags behind that in most other fields of applied microeconomics.
This paper showcases the use of high-tech surveillance data as a potential solution
to this problem, using ShotSpotter data on gunfire incidents to test the effects of
juvenile curfews on gun violence.
The best-known datasets on criminal behavior are the Uniform Crime Reports
(UCR) and National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS), both maintained
by the FBI. The UCR and NIBRS provide information on the number of reported
crimes at the reporting-agency level (typically a city or county); NIBRS also in-
cludes richer detail on these offenses for the subsample of jurisdictions that choose
to participate in the program. These are, technically, administrative data, but they
are collected from individual jurisdictions across the country and are rife with re-
sponse errors. Additionally, and by nature, they miss any criminal activity that is
not reported to law enforcement and recorded as a crime. This underreporting is
problematic because it undoubtedly varies across communities and crimes in a non-
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random manner. Reporting rates are likely affected by crime-prevention policies,
making it difficult to evaluate those policies’ impacts on true crime. Both the UCR
and NIBRS arguably improve upon large-scale surveys such as the National Crime
Victimization Survey (NCVS), which asks respondents to recall crimes from previous
months that they may or may not have reported to the police. In reality, these data
sources are complementary, due to concerns about the selective underreporting of
crime. All are, ultimately, imperfect proxies for true criminal activity.
An increasing number of academic papers rely instead on detailed administrative
data from local agencies. Local administrative data on individuals arrested for or
convicted of crimes provide more flexibility in terms of the issues researchers can
address (e.g. tracking individuals over time to measure recidivism). However, arrests
and convictions are, again, imperfect proxies for criminal behavior. For instance,
racial disparities in how individuals are perceived and/or treated by law enforcement,
victims, and witnesses, could affect the likelihood that they are included in these
datasets, conditional on the same underlying behavior. Such sample selection could
bias the apparent impacts of crime-prevention policies. A more objective source of
data on criminal activity would be extremely valuable but so far has been elusive.
Data on guns and gun violence are even worse. Researchers can use administrative
data on reported crime that include weapons used (such as NIBRS), but those include
only a subset of reported crime types. Many jurisdictions can provide data on 911
calls reporting shots fired. However, gunshots that do not hit anyone are often
not reported to police, and this selective underreporting is particularly problematic
in the most violent neighborhoods (ShotSpotter, 2013). The NCVS asks whether
respondents were victims of a crime committed with a firearm, but these data are
subject to the usual concerns about the validity of survey responses and self-selection
of respondents. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) maintains
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data on fatal injuries (from death certificates) and nonfatal injuries (from hospital
emergency rooms), but these will obviously not include information about gunshots
that do not result in injury, or individuals who avoid hospitals for fear of being
arrested. Data on gun sales and possession are scarce. The General Social Survey
(GSS) asks about gun ownership at the household level, but it is a relatively small
survey and, again, subject to concerns about survey responses. Each of these data
sources is a problematic proxy for true gun violence. Research based on these data
can provide suggestive evidence, at best.
This situation is distressing, given the important, often life-and-death, nature of
questions related to crime policy and criminal behavior. But there is good news:
improvements in technology are changing this status quo. As law enforcement and
governments increase their use of surveillance tools, they collect a great deal of
objective data on true criminal activity. These data have not yet been exploited
by social science researchers, but have the potential to revolutionize the field. This
paper uses one such source of data — the full universe of gunshots in Washington,
DC, detected by a technology called ShotSpotter — to demonstrate the potential of
high-quality surveillance data in the study of crime.
This development is exciting because it makes possible convincing evaluations of
crime policy interventions, which are sorely needed. While it is not unusual for laws
to have unintended consequences — a theme in many economics literatures — such
situations are depressingly common in criminal justice policy. For instance, Agan
(2011), Carr (2014), and Prescott and Rockoff (2011) find that sex offender registries
do not have a meaningful negative impact on sex offender recidivism, despite large
costs to offenders and the local agencies tasked with tracking them. Aizer and Doyle
(2013) find that incarcerating juveniles in formal detention facilities has a negative
impact on those kids’ future outcomes, actually increasing subsequent criminal be-
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havior rather than protecting and rehabilitating offenders. Kuziemko (2013) finds
that eliminating the discretion of parole boards, so that offenders serve their full
sentences, decreases rehabilitation efforts by inmates and increases recidivism. It is,
unfortunately, all too clear that crime prevention polices do not always have their
intended impact.
This is particularly likely in the battle against gun violence, which is a chronic
problem in the United States and has long been of interest to academics and policy-
makers.1 Many policies have been implemented over the years, from restrictions on
gun ownership (Ludwig, 1998; Marvell, 2001), to stand-your-ground laws (Cheng and
Hoekstra, 2013), to behavioral modification therapy for at-risk youth (Heller, Pollack,
Ander, and Ludwig, 2013). Discussions of gun violence tend to be emotionally-
and politically-charged, and, consequently, related policies often are not based on
empirical evidence. As policy-makers consider a growing array of available crime-
fighting tools and policies, it is important to rigorously evaluate what works and
what does not. Better data make this easier.
4.1.1 Measuring incapacitation effects on gun violence
Crime-prevention policies can work one of two ways: (1) by deterring crime,2
or (2) by incapacitating would-be offenders.3 If offenders have high discount rates
1See, for example: Ayres and Donohue (2003); Ludwig and Cook (2003); Donohue (2004); Cook
and Ludwig (2006); Cook, Ludwig, Venkatesh, and Braga (2007); Duggan, Hjalmarsson, and Jacob
(2011).
2Deterring crime requires changing the relative costs and benefits of committing a crime in such
a way that would-be offenders rationally choose not to offend. Deterrence-based policies typically
involve increasing the punishment or the probability of getting caught.
3Incapacitation is often thought of as synonymous with incarceration. In this paper, we follow
the literature and refer to policies that operate by changing the relative costs and benefits of being
in a particular location at a particular time as “incapacitation polices.” The idea is that these
policies reduce the opportunity to commit a crime, rather than the relative costs and benefits of
committing a crime, per se. Mandatory schooling and summer jobs for teens are examples of policies
that operate in this manner. Incarceration also fits this definition, as it heavily incentivizes being
in prison.
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and are unlikely to be deterred by potential punishments — a la Becker (1968)
— then limiting their opportunities to commit crime could be the most effective
crime-prevention policy. Policies that incentivize staying away from locations where
offending is likely might thus be more effective than polices that incentivize not
offending. Such incentive-based incapacitation should be particularly effective when
it comes to crimes of passion or opportunity, relative to premeditated crime. In this
paper we consider the crime-reducing impact of two common, but very different,
forms of incentive-based incapacitation in Washington, DC. In both cases, we use
exogenous variation in the hours that the intervention is in effect to test the effects
on gunshot incidents and reported crimes during those hours and over the course of
the day.4
The first intervention, a city-wide juvenile curfew, attempts to reduce violent
crime by incentivizing young people to be home during the nighttime hours when
crime is most prevalent. Juvenile curfews are common in cities across the country,
but their effectiveness depends heavily on how they are enforced. Furthermore, they
are a next-best policy, using age as a proxy for criminality and victimization. A first-
best policy would target all likely offenders and victims, regardless of age, but such a
policy is logistically, politically, and legally infeasible. Juvenile curfews are extremely
controversial for several reasons: (1) they give police officers discretion to stop any
young-looking persons who are out in public at night, which some worry results in
disproportionate targeting of racial minorities and contributes to tense relationships
with law enforcement; (2) they override the private decisions of parents; and (3) they
divert police resources from other, potentially more productive, activities. Given
these concerns, it is unclear whether such policies are effective, or if the benefits
4Doleac and Sanders (2012) show that criminal activity is not easily shifted from one hour of
the day to another, so there is reason to believe that would-be offenders respond to such policies
by staying out of trouble, rather than simply misbehaving at another time.
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outweigh the costs.
The second intervention is bad weather – specifically, rain. This intervention
also incentivizes local residents to go inside, but the “enforcement” is immediate,
consistent, and evenly-applied: anyone who stays outside in a rainstorm gets wet.
Bad weather is unconstrained by legal and political concerns, and so it applies to all
would-be offenders and victims instead of only juveniles. In these ways, it is an ideal
incapacitation “policy.”
Gun violence is an outcome of primary importance in the United States. Nation-
ally in 2011, 11,068 people were killed by assault with a firearm; 217 of the victims
were under age 15, and an additional 3,825 were ages 15-24.5 Based on the estimated
social cost of a homicide, this number implies that gun violence has a national so-
cial cost of $99.4 billion from deaths alone (McCollister, French, and Fang, 2010).
Many more people are injured by firearms each year: in 2010, 557,000 individuals
were treated in emergency rooms for injuries due to assaults by firearms and similar
mechanisms.6 In Washington, DC, there were 104 homicides in 2013, and firearms
were used in 81 of those deaths. In addition, there were 2,302 assaults with a deadly
weapon in the city, and 1,330 firearms were recovered by the police.7 Gun violence is
often cited as a motivator for juvenile curfew policies (Favro, 2009). It is also a good
example of a type of crime that results from anger- or passion-fueled altercations,
where incapacitation could be effective.
There is a small but growing literature on the effects of incapacitation on juve-
nile delinquency. Kline (2012) studied the impact of juvenile curfews on juvenile and
non-juvenile arrest rates in cities across the country. Using an event study design, he
5These numbers do not include suicides. CDC report, “Deaths: Final Data for 2011,” table 10.
6CDC: National Hospital Ambulatory Medical Care Survey: 2010 Emergency Department Sum-
mary Tables.
7Statistics on Washington, DC, crimes with guns come from the MPD’s 2013 Annual Report,
available at http://mpdc.dc.gov/.
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finds that curfews decrease arrest rates for those directly affected by the law. He also
finds evidence that arrest rates for older individuals decline, suggesting that juvenile
curfews have spillover effects. The interpretation of these results is complicated by
the nature of arrest rates: they are a function both of criminal behavior and police
behavior, and curfew laws likely affect both. (Curfews give police more opportu-
nity to stop and search young-looking individuals, potentially increasing detection
of crime. Alternatively, for marginal offenses, police might substitute from making
formal arrests to detaining youth for curfew violations. Arrest rates might also fall
if witnesses and victims are less willing to cooperate with police.) The advantage of
looking at arrest rates is that the age of the offender is known; however, the impact
on criminal activity is the primary outcome of interest when evaluating the cost-
effectiveness of this policy. The impact on arrest rates can provide only suggestive
evidence on that front.
Another way to keep potential delinquents out of trouble is to require all juveniles
to attend school during the day, when adult supervision is limited. Anderson (2014)
uses minimum dropout ages to measure the effect of mandatory school attendance on
crime. He finds that minimum dropout age requirements have statistically significant
and negative effects on arrest rates for individuals aged 16 to 18. Jacob and Lefgren
(2003) also study the impact of school attendance on crime, using exogenous variation
in teacher in-service days to estimate the causal impact of being in school on juvenile
delinquency. They find that property crimes go down when school is in session, while
violent crimes go up. (This points to an important consideration when devising
incapacitation strategies: keeping individuals off the streets by gathering them in
one place might increase interpersonal conflict. We do not observe reported or actual
domestic violence incidents in our data, but it is possible that juvenile curfews – and
rain – increase conflict at home.) Based on this evidence, we consider the impact of
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local school year start and end dates as a control and context for our juvenile curfew
results. It is possible that curfews’ impacts might depend on whether school is in
session – that is, school might substitute for or complement juvenile curfews.
Jacob, Lefgren, and Moretti (2007) use the correlation of weather with crime (at
the week level) to study the temporal displacement of criminal behavior. However,
their reliance on traditional reported crime data raises the question of whether bad
weather affects reporting rates as well as criminal behavior. Unpleasant weather
might keep witnesses and police indoors, with the effect that any apparent decrease
in crime is actually larger than the true decrease.
As described above, such selective under-reporting of crime is an important issue
in the broader economics of crime literature. The fundamental problem is that
we do not observe all crime that is committed, only the crime that is recorded in
administrative data. Reporting and recording rates likely differ across populations,
hours of the day, and geographic areas. If policies or events affect both the true
amount of crime and the rate at which crime is reported by victims or witnesses, or
recorded by police, the estimated effects will be biased in ways that are difficult to
predict (Pepper, Petrie, and Sullivan, 2010).
For instance, when juvenile curfews are in effect, some would-be offenders will
be at home instead of on the streets, and so criminal activity should fall. This is
the goal of the policy. However, residents who are less law-abiding are probably
more likely to break curfew, so the policy might simply clear the streets of potential
witnesses, reducing reporting rates. A larger police presence during curfew hours
could increase the rate at which criminal activity is observed and recorded in the data.
However, heavy-handed enforcement might decrease residents’ trust in authority and
cooperation with the police, decreasing reporting rates again. Meanwhile, baseline
reporting rates, as well as the elasticity of reporting with respect to crime rates,
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probably differ by neighborhood. So, if we see that curfews reduce reported crime,
how can we be sure that this represents a true decrease in criminal activity? And
how do we compare the magnitude of the effect with that of other policy options?
We use a new source of data, on gunfire, to address these concerns. The gunfire
data, generated by audio sensors installed by ShotSpotter, provide information on
the full universe of gunfire incidents in a covered area. They have two key advantages
over traditional reported crime data: (1) they have accurate and precise time stamps
and geo-codes, and (2) they are not subject to underreporting that could bias the
results. By using accurately-reported data, we eliminate the selection bias resulting
from variation in reporting rates over time, populations, and geographic areas.
For context, we also consider the effects of incapacitation on three broad cate-
gories of reported crime, using geo-coded data from the Metropolitan Police Depart-
ment (MPD). While less reliable than the gunfire results for all the reasons discussed
above, these results are interesting because they are more directly-comparable with
the previous literature on criminal behavior. If we wanted to study gun violence
without ShotSpotter data, these are the data we would have to use.
To test the impact of juvenile curfew laws in Washington, DC, we exploit spring
and fall changes in the curfew time as exogenous shocks to the hours when incapac-
itation is in effect. The curfew time for anyone under age 17 is 11pm on weeknights
and midnight on weekends from September through June, and midnight on all nights
during July and August.8 We use the discontinuous change in the weekday curfew
8The Juvenile Curfew Act of 1995 states that individuals under age 17 cannot be “in a public
place or on the premises of any establishment within the District of Columbia during curfew hours.”
Exceptions are made for several reasons, including if the juvenile is accompanied by a parent or
guardian, is working, or is involved in an emergency. During most of the year, curfew hours are
11:00pm on Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday nights, until 6:00am the following
morning. They are 12:01am until 6:00am on Saturday and Sunday (that is, Friday and Saturday
nights). During July and August, curfew hours are 12:01am to 6:00am every night. Juveniles who
are caught violating curfew are taken to the nearest police station and released to the custody of
their parents. They can also be sentenced to perform community service. Parents who violate the
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time from 11pm to midnight on July 1st, and from midnight to 11pm on September
1st, to test for an impact on violent crime during the affected hour and over the
course of the day.
We find minimal evidence that the juvenile curfew is effective. We see no change
in gun violence after the September curfew change. We observe an increase in gun
violence just after the July 1 curfew change, but the first week of July is heavily
confounded with the July 4th holiday week(end), and this is probably celebratory
gunfire. While celebratory gunfire is a real public safety concern, it is certainly not
due to the change in curfew time from 11pm to midnight. After dropping July 1-7
from our analysis, the early (11pm) curfew has no impact on gun violence during the
curfew-affected (11pm) hour or over the full day, nor does it seem to complement or
substitute for school attendance. (However, we find that “school in session” does have
a negative effect on gun violence, consistent with the literature on the incapacitation
effects of school.) Figure 4.1 shows gunfire data over this period, including thresholds
for both the curfew changes and school start and end dates.
To measure the effect of rain on crime, we merge hourly precipitation data with
hourly data on ShotSpotter sensor activations and MPD reported crimes. Rain serves
as an exogenous incapacitation shock in the city, and has a statistically significant
and meaningful negative effect on gun violence and reported crime. Citywide, the
typical rainy hour results in a 17% decrease in gunfire incidents; the decline is 12%
during nighttime hours (of interest because they are targeted by the juvenile curfew)
and 25% during the summer months. Rain has no discernible impact on reported
crimes on average, but when we look at only nighttime hours the typical rainy hour
results in 7% fewer reported crimes and 10% fewer reported violent crimes. In Ana-
curfew law by allowing their child to be in public during curfew hours can be fined up to $500 per
day. The curfew policy in Washington, DC, is very similar to policies in cities across the country.
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Figure 4.1: Daily Gunshot Incidents
Notes: Graphs show raw ShotSpotter data, aggregated to the PSA-day level, excluding July 1–7, along with fitted
lines from local linear regressions. The first and third vertical lines show start and end dates of the local public school
year; the second and fourth vertical lines show the start and end dates of summer curfew hours (curfew beginning
at midnight instead of 11pm).
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costia, a particularly violent part of the District (and where ShotSpotter was first
implemented in 2006), the typical nighttime rainstorm results in an 18% decrease
in gunshot incidents, and a 10% decrease in reported violent crime. These hourly
effects aggregate into statistically significant daily effects, suggesting that criminal
behavior is not simply shifted to other, more pleasant, times of day.
In both cases, data on Metro ridership reveal that these incapacitation policies
do have behavioral effects, reducing the number of people out during the hours of
interest. (While we do not use a 2SLS model, one can think of this as equivalent to
a “first stage.”) As noted above, the effect of the curfew does not translate into a re-
duction in crime, most likely because it affects a non-violent subset of the population.
The impact of rain is less (poorly) targeted.
We view this study as contributing to the academic literature in several ways:
(1) To our knowledge, this is the first study to use ShotSpotter data, or any data
generated by high-tech surveillance tools, to evaluate policy impacts. We describe
these data and demonstrate their research potential so that other researchers can
more easily use them. In general, using ShotSpotter data allows us to pick up effects
that reported crime data miss and provide valuable context for effects on reported
crime that could be driven by changes in reporting behavior. (2) We address gun
violence, which is of particular interest in the United States but is generally very
difficult to study due to the lack of reliable data. (3) We test the incapacitation
effects of a common policy (juvenile curfews) as well as a natural “intervention”
(rain), thereby adding to a growing literature on this topic.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 4.2 presents a simple model of how ju-
venile curfews affect crime; Section 4.3 describes the data; Section 4.4 describes our
empirical strategies; Section 4.5 describes our results; Section 4.6 considers the im-
pact on Metro ridership, as a robustness check; and Section 4.7 discusses the results
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and concludes.
4.2 A Simple Model
To frame our analysis, we present the following, idea-fixing model of how crime
is affected by incentive-based incapacitation policies like juvenile curfews:
The number of gunshot incidents in an area is a function of several factors, in-
cluding the number of would-be offenders on the streets (o) and the probability of
getting caught (p). The number of would-be offenders is a function of whether a
curfew (c) is in effect. The probability of getting caught is a function of the number
(or activity level) of law enforcement officers (l) and witnesses (w) in the area; both
of these are themselves functions of c. The curfew (c) decreases o, increases l and
decreases w.
Gunshots = g[o(c), p(l(c), w(c))]
We hypothesize that dg/do < 0 and do/dc < 0, so we expect the curfew to
decrease the number of gunshots through this channel. We also hypothesize that
dg/dp < 0, dp/dl > 0, and dp/dw > 0. However, dl/dc > 0, and dw/dc < 0, making
the impact of the curfew on the probability of getting caught (dp/dc) ambiguous.
The overall effect of the curfew on gunfire (dg/dc) is therefore ambiguous.
The number of reported crimes is a function of the same parameters as above
but also depends on whether an incident is reported to police. Thus, we add the
parameter Ir, an indicator for whether a crime was reported, which is a function of
l and w; these are each affected by c as above.
Reported Crime = f [o(c), p(l(c), w(c)), Ir(l(c), w(c))]
We hypothesize that dIr/dl > 0 and dIr/dw > 0 — that is, having more cops
or witnesses in the area increases reporting — but because the curfew affects l and
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w in opposite directions dIr/dc is ambiguous. The overall effect of the curfew on
reported crime, df/dc is again ambiguous, but further complicated by this reporting
parameter. (Note that the unsigned bias on the estimated impact on true crime
comes from the ambiguous effect on reporting.)
4.3 Data
4.3.1 ShotSpotter data
We use ShotSpotter data from Washington, DC, from January 2006 through June
2013, aggregated to the level of Police Service Areas (PSAs).9 The technology was
first implemented in Police District 7 (Anacostia) in January 2006, then expanded to
Police Districts 5 and 6 in March 2008, and to Police District 3 in July 2008. These
are the areas of DC that have the highest crime rates, and so were expected to have
the highest rates of gunfire. Figure 4.2 shows heatmaps of the raw gunshot data for
each year.10 Figure 4.3 plots the average number of gunshot incidents each week over
the full year, divided into morning, afternoon, and nighttime hours. Note that there
are more gunshot incidents detected at night, on average, and that there is a great
deal of celebratory gunfire around the New Year’s and July 4th holidays.
ShotSpotter technology consists of audio sensors installed around the city; these
sensors detect gunshots, then triangulate the precise location of the sound.11 A com-
9Each Police District is composed of several PSAs.
10We represent the geographic dispersion of gunshots using heat maps because the large quantity
of gunshots makes detecting the most densely concentrated areas difficult if we simply plot points.
We construct the maps using a “point density” operation that creates a grid over the map and
then counts the number of gunshots within each grid cell. The darker colors represent the highest
concentration of gunshots.
11Importantly for our study, the sound of rain should not substantially impact the ability of the
gunshot sensors to pick up the sound of gunfire. The noise from rainfall is typically 50 decibels;
the sound of gunshots is 150 decibels or louder, depending on the type of gun (Center for Hearing
and Communication, 2014). Sensors are placed in enough locations in covered districts that the
distance from gunshots will not be large. Rain would need to be painfully loud to drown out the
sound of gunfire. As mentioned below, we drop hourly observations with the most rain in order to
exclude unusual storms, so this should be even less of a concern.
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Figure 4.2: Heatmaps of ShotSpotter-Detected Gunshot Incidents
Notes: Shaded regions show the location of detected gunfire in Washington, DC, in each year (January 2006 through
June 2013), along with labeled outlines of the seven Police Districts. Darker regions signify more gunfire. Note that
ShotSpotter sensors cover primarily Districts, 3, 5, 6, and 7; we restrict our analyses to these regions.
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Figure 4.3: Daily Gunshot Incidents
Notes: Graphs show the average number of city-wide ShotSpotter-detected gunshot incidents, by week, during the
morning, afternoon, and night hours, respectively. Geographic coverage: Police Districts 3, 5, 6, 7. Years: 2006-2013.
Data source: MPD.
puter algorithm distinguishes the sound of gunfire from other loud noises, and human
technicians verify those classifications.12 Once verified, this information is relayed to
law enforcement so that police officers can quickly respond to the scene. (There may
be occasional false positives or negatives – that is, noises that aren’t gunshots that
are recorded as gunshots, or gunshots that are missed — but these mistakes will be
randomly distributed. This is far less problematic than the selective underreporting
present in reported crime data.) The result is precisely time-stamped and geo-coded
data on the full universe of gunfire incidents in a covered area. ShotSpotter is cur-
rently active in over seventy cities in the United States; while considered proprietary
in most locations, these data are available from the MPD via public records request.
The data include the date and time that the gunfire incident was detected, the
latitude and longitude of the incident, and whether the incident consisted of a single
gunshot or multiple gunshots. Conversations with law enforcement and ShotSpotter
employees suggest that some single-gunshot incidents are individuals test-firing guns
they are buying on the street; for this reason, we show results separately for multiple-
12The sounds are classified as gunshots, construction, fireworks, car backfire, and so on. Only
the gunshot incidents are included in our data.
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gunshot incidents only. Multiple-gunshot incidents are also less likely to include
“false-positives” such as construction noise or car backfires.
Based on comparisons of gunfire data with 911 calls in other cities, ShotSpotter
estimates that less than 20% of gunfire incidents are reported to the police (ShotSpot-
ter, 2013). It is likely that reporting rates are particularly low in the most violent
neighborhoods because gunfire is common and residents have less trust in law en-
forcement.13 By collecting the full universe of gunfire data, we avoid the selection
bias that underreporting would cause.
Excluding outlier days such as New Year’s Eve and July 4th, there were an
average of 7.4 gunfire incidents per day across the Police Districts where ShotSpotter
is currently implemented; 3.8 of these were multiple-gunshot incidents.14 Table 4.1
presents summary statistics. Appendix C.1 describes the data in greater detail.
4.3.2 Reported crime data
We use geo-coded, time-stamped data on reported crime from the Metropolitan
Police Department (MPD), from 2011 through 2013, aggregated to the PSA-level.
Due to a technical problem at the MPD, geo-coded data are not available for dates
prior to January 2011. The offenses reported include: homicide, sexual abuse, assault
with a dangerous weapon, robbery, burglary, arson, motor vehicle theft, theft from an
automobile, and other theft. We code the first four crime types as “violent crimes.”
The data also include information on the weapon used, if any; we code any crime in
which a gun is listed as the weapon as a “gun crime.” Without ShotSpotter data,
these outcomes would be the best available to study gun violence.
The geo-codes and time stamps will generally be less precise than in the ShotSpot-
13This hypothesis is supported by anecdotal evidence collected by ShotSpotter employees as the
technology has been implemented across the country.
14Including outliers, there were 13.1 gunfire incidents per day, on average; 7.1 of those were
multiple-gunshot incidents.
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ter data. The geo-codes are reported at the block level, rather then the exact latitude
and longitude. The times are often estimates based on victims’ and witnesses’ rec-
ollections, and/or the time the incident was reported.
We restrict our analysis to the areas covered by ShotSpotter (Police Districts 3,
5, 6, and 7).
Summary statistics are in Table 4.1. Across DC, there were an average of 53.5
reported crimes per day, and gun and violent crimes contributed on average 4.4 and
13.1 crimes, respectively.
4.3.3 Weather data
Hourly precipitation data from 2006 through 2013 come from the National Cli-
matic Data Center at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
We use data from the weather station at Reagan National Airport, located just out-
side of Washington, DC. (This is the closest weather station from which hourly data
are available.) The data are measured in centimeters.
In our preferred specifications, we drop the top 1% of the distribution of non-
zero hourly precipitation observations. This excludes unusually-severe weather (e.g.
tropical storms, hurricanes) that might be correlated with confounding events such
as power outages and school closings.
We also use daily data on temperature as a control; these data are from the same
source.
4.3.4 Metro data
We use data on Metro ridership from the Washington Metro Area Transit Author-
ity (WMATA). These include the number of entries and exits, by station, by hour,
by date. As above, we focus on the areas of the city where ShotSpotter is active:
Police Districts 3, 5, 6, and 7. Summary statistics are in Table 4.1. Figure 4.4 shows
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Figure 4.4: Metro Station Locations
2
7
4
1
5
6
3
Metro Stations and Police Districts
SST coverage
Notes: Map shows the location of WMATA Metro stations and boundaries for MPD Police Districts. The Districts
with with ShotSpotter coverage are shaded. Data source: MPD and WMATA
Metro station locations in Washington, DC, along with Police District boundaries.
4.4 Empirical Strategy
4.4.1 Juvenile curfew
We exploit the discontinuous changes in curfew time on July 1 (from 11pm to
midnight) and September 1 (from midnight to 11pm), to test for the impact of the
curfew on violent crime during evening hours. If incapacitating juveniles during these
hours improves public safety, we should see a discontinuous increase in crime during
the 11pm hour beginning July 1st, and a discontinuous decrease in crime during
the same hour beginning September 1st. However, we note that the former change
occurs while juveniles are on summer vacation, while the latter change occurs during
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the academic year; we will control for this.
We employ a Regression Discontinuity (RD) specification to measure the causal
impact of the curfew on crime during the hour directly affected by the curfew change.
If there is an impact on crime due to the change in the number of people out in public
(acting as offenders, victims, or witnesses), any observed effect should be driven by
activity during the 11pm hour. We then add specifications that control for whether
school is in session, along with an interaction term allowing the impact of the curfew
to differ when school is in session.
We use the following primary specification, with data from four weeks on either
side of each curfew change, and focusing only on crime occurring during the 11pm
hour each day:
Crimei,d,p = α + β1EarlyCurfewd + β2Seasond + δ1f(running vard) ∗ Seasond
+ δ2f(running vard) ∗ Seasond ∗ Curfewd + ωw + λdayofweek
+ γyear + ρPSA + ei,d,p (4.1)
where i is the crime type, d is the day of observation, and p is the Police Service
Area (PSA). ωw is a vector of weather variables, including temperature and precipi-
tation. Early Curfew is an indicator for whether the curfew time is 11pm, instead of
midnight. The running variable is day of the year. This specification includes fixed
effects for year, day of the week, and PSA. It includes separate running variable
functions for the spring and fall curfew changes (Season is an indicator for spring
or fall.) It also allows the slope to vary before and after the curfew change. In our
primary specification, these functions are linear, though the results are not sensitive
to this choice. The main coefficient of interest is β1.
We also use the specification above to test for daily effects, where Crime is the
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the number of incidents occurring over the entire day. If any impact is driven by a
change in police resources, diverting officers from activities at other times of day to
curfew-enforcement at night, then we would expect to see a change in daily crime
but not necessarily in the 11pm hour. Looking at aggregate daily crime will also
capture changes due to juveniles shifting their activity to accommodate the curfew
time (i.e., they might go out earlier when they know they need to be home earlier).
We test for effects on several outcome measures: (1) gunfire incidents, (2) multiple
gunfire incidents, (3) all reported crimes, (4) reported crimes involving a gun, and
(5) reported violent crimes.
As discussed above, the raw ShotSpotter data show a large increase in gunfire
during the week of July 4th, as shown in Figure 4.3. This is likely celebratory gunfire
due to the holiday, which, while certainly a public safety hazard, is not due to the
change in the curfew time. To avoid confounding the effect of the holiday with the
effect of the curfew, we drop July 1–7 from the analysis.15 We note that this risks
missing any short-term effect of the spring curfew change, but even if such an effect
were real it would tell us more about the effect of a curfew change, not the curfew
itself.
The geographic and temporal precision of the ShotSpotter data allow us to an-
alyze Police Districts separately. We conduct the analysis separately for Anacostia
(District 7), which is of particular interest due to the high level of violence in that
part of town.
For ease of interpretation, our preferred specifications use an OLS model. For
15As an alternative, we have also tried simply dropping outlier hours and days, but the remaining
data still included an increase in gunfire coincident with the July 1 curfew change. This might be
due to the later curfew (i.e., kids celebrating the start of summer by staying out later and getting
into trouble) but we cannot be sure that this is not a lingering effect of the July 4th holiday. In any
case, the short-term increase in gunfire drops off quickly. To be especially conservative, we favor
this specification, where we drop July 1-7 completely.
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robustness, we run similar analyses using (a) a Poisson regression, because the out-
come measures are count variables, and (b) a logit regression, using 0/1 indicators
of any gunshots or crime incidents as the outcome measures. The latter should be
less sensitive to outlier hours/days.
4.4.2 Rain
An ideal incapacitation experiment would randomly select some hours of the
day to be treated and other hours to be controls, then see if crime falls during
the particular hours when local residents were incentivized to go inside. This is
essentially what rain does. Because the timing of individual rainstorms is exogenous
with respect to local crime trends, we can think of hours during which it is raining
as treated and those during which it is dry as controls. Furthermore, the amount
of rain represents the intensity of the treatment, with more rain imposing a larger
incapacitation effect.
We use the following Difference-in-Difference specification to test for the impact
of rain by hour:
Crimei,h,p = α + β1Rainh + λhourofday + δdayofweek + ωweekofyear + γmonth
+ φyear + ρPSA + ei,h,p (4.2)
where i is the crime type, h is the hour of observation, and p is the Police Service
Area (PSA). This specification includes fixed effects for hour of the day, day of the
week, week of the year, month, year, and PSA. Rain is the amount of rain measured
during the hour, measured in centimeters. The coefficient of interest is β1.
If criminal activity is simply shifted from wet to dry hours, total daily crime would
not change. (Note that in that case an incapacitation effect would still exist, but the
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ultimate impact on public safety would be reduced.) We use a similar specification
to test for the impact of rain at the daily level:
Crimei,d,p = α + β1Raind + β2Tempd + δdayofweek + ωweekofyear + γmonth
+ φyear + ρPSA + ei,d,p (4.3)
where i is the crime type, d is the day of observation, and p is the Police Service
Area (PSA). This specification includes daily max temperature as well as fixed effects
for day of the week, week of the year, month, year, and Police Service Area. The
coefficient of interest is again β1.
We again test for effects on several outcome measures: (1) gunfire incidents, (2)
multiple gunfire incidents, (3) all reported crimes, (4) reported crimes involving a
gun, and (5) reported violent crimes. We also conduct the analysis separately for
nighttime hours (9pm-2am), summer months (June–September), and Anacostia.
As before, we also analyze results using (a) a Poisson regression, and (b) a logit
regression, testing the effect of any rain on any gunshot or crime incidents.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Juvenile curfew
The first two panels of Table 4.2 present the results of the juvenile curfew analysis
using ShotSpotter data. Columns 1–3 show effects on gunfire during the 11pm hour
affected by the curfew change; columns 4–6 show effects on gunfire over the entire
day. In all cases we use our preferred specification, an OLS model with a linear trend
in the running variable (day of year), and dropping July 1–7.
If the earlier curfew is effective in reducing criminal activity, we should see neg-
ative and statistically significant coefficients on early curfew. This is not what we
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Table 4.2: Effect of Curfews and School on Gun Violence
11pm - midnight All Day
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All SST-Detected Gunshot Incidents
early curfew 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.061 0.060 0.058
(0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.049) (0.049) (0.069)
school in session -0.024** -0.024*** -0.065 -0.068
(0.011) (0.007) (0.058) (0.057)
school * early curfew 0.000 0.003
(0.012) (0.066)
mean daily activations .049 .049 .049 .412 .412 .412
SST-Detected Multiple Gunshot Incidents
early curfew 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.039 0.038 0.043
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.037) (0.036) (0.049)
school in session -0.021** -0.022*** -0.073* -0.063*
(0.008) (0.005) (0.037) (0.037)
school * early curfew 0.002 -0.012
(0.010) (0.044)
mean daily activations .028 .028 .028 .242 .242 .242
Observations 18073 18073 18073 18073 18073 18073
MPD Reported Crimes
early curfew -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.040 -0.040 0.064
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.069) (0.070) (0.085)
school in session -0.039* -0.041* 0.007 0.102
(0.020) (0.024) (0.056) (0.083)
school * early curfew 0.004 -0.176
(0.023) (0.106)
mean daily reported crimes .100 .100 .100 1.817 1.817 1.817
MPD Reported Gun Crimes
early curfew -0.000 -0.000 -0.004 -0.041* -0.041* -0.034
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
school in session 0.004 0.001 0.011 0.017
(0.005) (0.008) (0.018) (0.024)
school * early curfew 0.006 -0.012
(0.009) (0.028)
mean daily gun crimes .011 .011 .011 .135 .135 .135
MPD Reported Violent Crimes
early curfew -0.005 -0.005 -0.008 -0.003 -0.004 0.035
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.032) (0.032) (0.044)
school in session -0.005 -0.008 0.035 0.071
(0.012) (0.014) (0.037) (0.048)
school * early curfew 0.006 -0.065
(0.012) (0.056)
mean daily violent crimes .033 .033 .033 .442 .442 .442
Observations 9951 9951 9951 9951 9951 9951
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Notes: Standard errors are clustered on the running variable (day of year) and are shown in parentheses. Outcome
measure: Number of gunshot incidents or reported crimes. Dates included: 4 weeks before and after July 1 and
September 1. Years 2006-2013 for gunshot data, years 2011-2013 for reported crime data. Analysis uses data from
Police Districts 3, 5, 6, and 7. All specifications include: year, day of week and PSA fixed effects; precipitation;
temperature. ShotSpotter and reported crime data source: MPD. Weather data source: NOAA.
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find. In column 1 we see that the earlier curfew has no impact on crime during the
11pm hour. The sign on the coefficient is positive and statistically insignificant.
Column 2 adds a control for whether school is in session. As discussed above,
there is evidence from other studies that mandatory schooling has an incapacitation
effect on crime. When we add this control, we see almost no change in the early
curfew coefficient, but do find that there are significantly fewer gunshot incidents
during the 11pm hour when school is in session. The coefficient indicates that total
gunshot incidents during that evening hour decrease by 0.024, equivalent to 49% of
the mean in that hour. Multiple gunshot incidents decrease by 0.021, equivalent
to 75% of the mean. These results support the findings of other studies that school
attendance reduces crime, and suggest that juveniles are better-behaved overall while
school is in session, not only during school hours.
Finally, we interact the early curfew variable with the school in session variable,
and include this interaction term to test for whether the curfew and school are
substitutes or complements. Again, adding this term has almost no impact on the
previous results, and its coefficient is statistically insignificant as well as quite small.
It appears that the effect of the curfew does not depend at all on whether school is
in session.
Columns 4–6 show the impact on gunshot incidents over the course of the entire
day. The results are qualitatively similar: The early (11pm) curfew has a positive
but insignificant effect on total gunshot incidents and multiple-gunshot incidents.
The effect of school in session is negative, but marginally significant only for the
multiple-gunshot outcome measure. Again, we find no evidence that the curfew acts
as a substitute for or complement to school.
We repeat the above analyses using reported crime data, and the results are
presented in the bottom three panels of Table 4.2. Recall that reporting behavior
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might change in response to the curfew, so reported crime results could be biased
upward or downward. In general these results are less precise than the gunshot
results, so it is difficult to discern any meaningful patterns. There is little evidence
that the curfew affects reported crime. We find a marginally-significant negative
effect of the early curfew on reported gun crimes over the course of the day, but
the imprecise estimate, along with the absence of any impact during the 11pm hour
and the above (insignificant) impact on gunshots, lead us to interpret this as simply
noise. It appears that reported crime falls during the 11pm hour when school is in
session, as gunshot incidents do, but that effect is only marginally significant.
Table 4.3 shows the equivalent effects in Anacostia only. The patterns are quite
similar to those described above, though the results are a bit less precise: the early
curfew has no statistically significant effect on gunshot incidents during the 11pm
hour or over the entire day, and there is a decrease in gunshot incidents (during the
11pm hour and over the entire day) when school is in session. However, when we focus
on this neighborhood, we find evidence that the early curfew and school attendance
act as substitutes. That is, there is a positive coefficient on the school*early curfew
interaction term.
Focusing on reported crime in Anacostia, the patterns are again similar to those
described above. There is more suggestive evidence that the early curfew has a
negative effect on the number of reported gun crimes and reported violent crimes:
The coefficients on early curfew are negative and marginally significant for both
of these outcome measures, though only when looking at crime over the course of
the day (not during the 11pm hour affected by the curfew). Without the context
of the gunfire data, we might interpret these results as evidence that the curfew is
working. With the context of the gunfire results, we can more confidently interpret
these imprecise estimates as the result of statistical noise and/or effects on reporting
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Table 4.3: Effect of Curfews and School on Gun Violence: Anacostia Only
11pm - midnight All Day
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All SST-Detected Gunshot Incidents
early curfew 0.007 0.006 -0.006 0.113 0.111 0.056
(0.017) (0.016) (0.019) (0.074) (0.073) (0.089)
school in session -0.044** -0.070*** -0.221** -0.340***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.096) (0.104)
school * early curfew 0.034* 0.155
(0.019) (0.102)
mean daily activations .073 .073 .073 .634 .634 .634
SST-Detected Multiple Gunshot Incidents
early curfew -0.005 -0.005 -0.015 0.015 0.013 -0.036
(0.011) (0.010) (0.014) (0.054) (0.054) (0.064)
school in session -0.025* -0.046*** -0.134** -0.241***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.063) (0.061)
school * early curfew 0.027* 0.139**
(0.015) (0.064)
mean daily activations .039 .039 .039 .357 .357 .357
Observations 5992 5992 5992 5992 5992 5992
MPD Reported Crimes
early curfew -0.009 -0.008 0.007 -0.122 -0.122 0.183
(0.023) (0.023) (0.030) (0.137) (0.138) (0.189)
school in session -0.012 0.003 -0.001 0.279*
(0.025) (0.031) (0.106) (0.153)
school * early curfew -0.027 -0.517***
(0.033) (0.194)
mean daily reported crimes .090 .090 .090 1.533 1.533 1.533
MPD Reported Gun Crimes
early curfew -0.008 -0.008 -0.005 -0.073* -0.073* -0.032
(0.010) (0.010) (0.018) (0.043) (0.043) (0.057)
school in session 0.014 0.017 0.001 0.039
(0.009) (0.013) (0.045) (0.061)
school * early curfew -0.005 -0.069
(0.018) (0.066)
mean daily gun crimes .014 .014 .014 .188 .188 .188
MPD Reported Violent Crimes
early curfew -0.021 -0.021 -0.031 -0.124* -0.125* -0.056
(0.015) (0.015) (0.025) (0.067) (0.067) (0.092)
school in session 0.004 -0.005 0.019 0.083
(0.015) (0.021) (0.070) (0.113)
school * early curfew 0.017 -0.118
(0.028) (0.124)
mean daily violent crimes .038 .038 .038 .508 .508 .508
Observations 2568 2568 2568 2568 2568 2568
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Notes: Standard errors are clustered on the running variable (day of year) and are shown in parentheses. Outcome
measure: Number of gunshot incidents or reported crimes. Dates included: 4 weeks before and after July 1 and
September 1. Years 2006-2013 for gunshot data, years 2011-2013 for reported crime data. Analysis uses data from
Police District 7 (Anacostia). All specifications include: year, day of week and PSA fixed effects; precipitation;
temperature. ShotSpotter and reported crime data source: MPD. Weather data source: NOAA.
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rather than actual criminal behavior.
Appendix C.2.1 includes results varying the bandwidth of analysis (Table C.1).
The gunfire results are quite similar when the bandwidth is 2 or 3 weeks instead of 4:
the coefficients are similar in size and remain statistically insignificant. The reported
crime results are extremely noisy, but continue to show little evidence that juvenile
curfews have any significant impact.
Also in the Appendix, Tables C.2 and C.3 show Poisson and logit results, which
are very similar to those described above. Across all specifications and models, there
is no convincing evidence that juvenile curfews reduce gun violence.
4.5.2 Rain
Turning our attention to the “ideal” incapacitation policy, bad weather, we see
much more striking results. Table 4.4 shows the effect of hourly rain on hourly
criminal activity. The rain variable represents the intensity of treatment, and we
expect more rain to provide a greater incentive to go inside and thus to have a larger
negative effect on gun violence. When we look at the first two panels, showing the
impact on total gunshot incidents and multiple-gunshot incidents, respectively, that
is indeed what we find, and all results are statistically significant.
Columns 1–3 include data from all hours of the day. In column 1, we see that
an additional centimeter of rainfall results in 0.021 fewer total gunshot incidents
(0.011 multiple-gunshot incidents); with average non-zero hourly rainfall equal to
0.16 cm, this is equivalent to a 17% (18%) decline in gunshot incidents during a
typical rainy hour. Column 2 presents results for the summer only, and they are
quite similar. One centimeter of rainfall results in 0.031 fewer gunshot incidents
(0.018 fewer multiple-gunshot incidents); this is equivalent to a 25% (14%) decrease
in gunfire during the typical rainy hour. Column 3 presents results for Anacostia
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Table 4.4: Effect of Precipitation on Gun Violence: Hourly Results
All hours Night only (9pm–2am)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All SST-Detected Gunshot Incidents
Rain (cm) -0.021∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.020) (0.017)
No-rain mean 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.07
SST-Detected Multiple Gunshot Incidents
Rain (cm) -0.011∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.012) (0.010)
No-rain mean 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.04
Observations 1553596 516525 502336 388290 129094 125536
MPD Reported Crimes
Rain (cm) -0.008 -0.005 -0.000 -0.030∗∗ -0.037∗∗ -0.002
(0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.012) (0.016) (0.015)
No-rain mean 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.06
MPD Reported Gun Crimes
Rain (cm) -0.002 -0.001 -0.005 -0.006∗∗ -0.006∗ -0.012∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
No-rain mean 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
MPD Reported Violent Crimes
Rain (cm) -0.005 -0.001 -0.007 -0.016∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007)
No-rain mean 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
Observations 678249 203608 175032 169539 50677 43752
Average hourly rainfall (cm) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Average non-zero hourly rainfall (cm) 0.16 0.24 0.17 0.18 0.27 0.18
Summer only (June-September) X X
Anacostia only X X
Night only (9pm to 2am) X X X
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Notes: Standard errors, clustered by day of year, are shown in parentheses. Outcome measure: Number of gunshot
incidents or reported crimes. Analysis uses data from Police Districts 3, 5, 6, and 7, unless otherwise noted. Years
of analysis: 2006-2013 for ShotSpotter data. 2011-2013 for reported crime data. Hourly observations with the top
1% of rainfall are excluded. All specifications include: year, month, hour, week of year, day of week, and PSA fixed
effects. Precipitation data source: NOAA. ShotSpotter and reported crime data source: MPD.
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only: one centimeter of rainfall results in 0.03 fewer gunshot incidents (0.015 fewer
multiple gunshot incidents); this is equivalent to a 17% (26%) decrease in gunfire
during the typical rainy hour.
Columns 4–6 include data on overnight hours (9pm–2am) only, as these are the
hours targeted by juvenile curfews. The results in column 4 show that a centimeter of
rainfall during these overnight hours results in 0.041 fewer gunshot incidents (0.023
fewer multiple-gunshot incidents); this is equivalent to a 12% (14%) decrease in
gunfire during the typical rainy hour. During the summer (column 5), this effect
is a bit larger in magnitude: a centimeter of rain decreases the number of gunfire
incidents by 0.066 (multiple-gunshot incidents by 0.041). This is equivalent to a 20%
(22%) decrease in gunfire during the typical rainy hour. In Anacostia (column 6),
a centimeter of rain overnight results in 0.071 fewer gunshot incidents (0.037 fewer
multiple-gunshot incidents). This is equivalent to a an 18% (17%) decrease in gunfire
during the typical rainy hour.
Panels 3–5 present results using reported crime data. These data are too noisy to
pick up an effect looking over the full day, but rain has a strong, negative impact on
reported crime when the sample is restricted to nighttime hours. Unless otherwise
noted, all effects are statistically significant.
We look first at column 4: a centimeter of rain results in 0.03 fewer total reported
crimes, 0.006 fewer reported gun crimes, and 0.016 fewer reported violent crimes
at night. These effects are equivalent to 7%, 11%, and 10% declines in reported
crime during the typical rainy hour, respectively. All of these effects are statistically
significant. Using the gunfire results for context, we can be more confident that
these effects represent a true decrease in criminal activity rather than simply a drop
in reporting.
Column 5 presents results for the summer months (July–September) only. A cen-
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timeter of overnight rainfall results in 0.037 fewer total reported crimes, 0.006 fewer
reported gun crimes, and 0.019 fewer violent crimes. These effects are equivalent
to 11%, 16%, and 17% decreases in reported crime during the typical rainy hour,
respectively. The impact on reported gun crimes is only marginally significant.
Column 6 shows effect in Anacostia only. A centimeter of overnight rainfall results
in 0.002 fewer total reported crimes, 0.012 fewer reported gun crimes, and 0.017
fewer violent crimes. These effects are equivalent to 1%, 22%, and 10% decreases
in reported crime during the typical rainy hour, respectively. The impact on total
reported crimes is not significant.
Table C.4 in Appendix C.2.2 presents results using all precipitation data (that is,
not dropping outlier storms). The effects are quite similar, though the coefficients
are slightly smaller and we lose some statistical power.16
Table 4.5 shows the effects of rain on criminal activity, aggregated to the day-
level. The amount of rain over the course of the day has a large negative effect on
the amount of criminal activity that day, even after controlling for a broad array
of fixed effects and daily temperature. This suggests that an hour of rain does not
simply shift criminal activity to other hours of the day (consistent with the effect of
Daylight Saving Time found in Doleac and Sanders, 2012), which makes sense if it
operates primarily on crimes of passion or opportunity.
In column 1 we see that a centimeter of rain results in 0.023 fewer gunshot
incidents, 0.013 fewer multiple-gunshot incidents, 0.056 fewer total reports crimes,
0.011 fewer reported gun crimes, and 0.018 fewer reported violent crimes. These
effects are equivalent to 4%, 4%, 3%, 7%, and 4% declines on rainy days, respectively.
In column 2, we restrict our attention to summer months (June–September) only.
16We also try alternative specifications using non-linear functions of precipitation; they are qual-
itatively similar, but we prefer the linear specification for its simplicity and ease of interpretation.
The other results are, of course, available upon request.
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Table 4.5: Effect of Precipitation on Gun Violence: Daily Results
(1) (2) (3)
All SST-Detected Gunshot Incidents
Rain (cm) -0.023∗∗ -0.060∗∗ -0.039∗∗
(0.012) (0.024) (.016)
No-rain mean 0.53 0.68 0.71
SST-Detected Multiple Gunshot Incidents
Rain (cm) -0.013∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.020∗
(0.008) (0.004) (0.011)
No-rain mean 0.29 0.41 0.38
Observations 66900 22259 21632
MPD Reported Crimes
Rain (cm) -0.056∗∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗
(0.010) (0.015) (0.014)
No-rain mean 1.70 1.83 1.38
MPD Reported Gun Crimes
Rain (cm) -0.011∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
No-rain mean 0.14 0.13 0.18
MPD Reported Violent Crimes
Rain (cm) -0.018∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗ -0.018∗
(0.005) (0.008) (0.010)
No-rain mean 0.42 0.45 0.48
Observations 29202 8773 7536
Average daily rainfall (cm) 0.27 0.31 0.28
Average non-zero daily rainfall (cm) 0.87 1.03 0.91
Summer only (June-September) X
Anacostia only X
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Standard errors, clustered by day of year, are shown in parentheses. Outcome measure: Number of gunshot incidents
or reported crimes. Analysis uses data from Police Districts 3, 5, 6, 7, unless otherwise noted. Years of analysis:
2006-2013 for ShotSpotter data. 2011-2013 for reported crime data. All specifications include: year, month, week of
year, day of week, and PSA fixed effects. Precipitation data source: NOAA. ShotSpotter and reported crime data
source: MPD.
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During the summer, a centimeter of rain results in 0.06 fewer gunshot incidents,
0.016 fewer multiple-gunshot incidents, 0.054 fewer total reported crimes, 0.01 fewer
reported gun crimes, and 0.02 fewer reported violent crimes. These effects are equiv-
alent to 9%, 4%, 3%, 8%, and 5% declines, respectively.
Finally, in column 3, we restrict our attention to Anacostia. During the summer,
a centimeter of rain results in 0.039 fewer gunshot incidents, 0.02 fewer multiple-
gunshot incidents, 0.035 fewer total reports crimes, 0.017 fewer reported gun crimes,
and 0.018 fewer reported violent crimes. These effects are equivalent to 5%, 5%, 2%,
9%, and 3% declines, respectively.
Tables C.5–C.8 in Appendix C.2.2 show the results of the above analyses using
Poisson and logit models instead of OLS. The observed effects of rain on gunshot
incidents are extremely similar in all cases, and remain statistically significant. The
day-level effects of rain on reported crime are statistically insignificant when using
the logit model, suggesting that outliers might be driving those results; the gunshot
results remain statistically significant.
4.6 Robustness Check: Metro Ridership
Any effects on crime presume an underlying change in behavior induced by the
incapacitation policy. To be more convinced that this is the mechanism through
which rain reduces gun violence, we would like to see evidence that the number
of people out in the city is lower during rainy hours. Similarly, we would like to
understand whether juvenile curfews aren’t effective at reducing crime because they
don’t affect behavior at all or because they’re simply not affecting the violent subset
of the population.
To get at this issue, we use data on Metro (subway) ridership from 2011 to 2014
to measure the impact of these incapacitation policies on the number of people out
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in the city. (While we are not using a 2SLS specification, this analysis is in the spirit
of a “first stage.”)
In the case of curfews, where juveniles are supposed to be home by a certain time,
we are particularly interested in the effect of the curfew time on the number of exits
at night. We use the variation in the curfew hour, as above, to test whether Metro
exits fall after juveniles are supposed to be home. To test the effect of the juvenile
curfew on Metro ridership, we use the following RD specification (similar to that in
Section 4.4.1), with data from 9pm–2am during the four weeks on either side of each
curfew change:
Ridershiph,s = α + β1AfterCurfewTimeh + β2EarlyCurfewDayd + β3Seasond
+ δ1f(running vard) ∗ Seasond
+ δ2f(running vard) ∗ Seasond ∗ EarlyCurfewDayd
+ λhourofday + δdayofweek + φyear + ρstation + eh,s (4.4)
where h is the hour of observation, d is the day of observation, and s is the station.
This specification includes fixed effects for hour of the day, day of the week, year,
and Metro station. EarlyCurfewDay is an indicator that the day is before July 1
or after September 1, and thus the early curfew is in effect. AfterCurfewTime is
an indicator that the hour of observation is after 11pm when the early curfew is in
effect, and after midnight otherwise – that is, the hour is one when juveniles should
be home. β1 is the coefficient of interest, revealing the effect of the curfew on Metro
ridership. If the curfew induces juveniles to get home before the curfew time, β1
should be negative and statistically significant.
As above, we also consider specifications including an indicator for whether school
is in session, as well as a school*curfew interaction term.
102
In the case of rain, it is less clear, a priori, whether we should expect fewer entries
or exits due to bad weather, but we expect to see less traffic overall, as people put off
running errands, leaving work, or meeting friends until after the rain has ended. We
use the following Difference-in-Difference regression, with data from the full year:
Ridershiph,s = α + β1Rainh + λhourofday + δdayofweek + ωweekofyear + φyear
+ ρstation + eh,s (4.5)
where h is the hour of observation, and s is the station. This specification includes
fixed effects for hour of the day, day of the week, week of the year, year, and Metro
station. Rain is the amount of rain during that particular hour or an indicator for
whether than was any rain during that hour. β1 is the coefficient of interest, revealing
the effect of rain on Metro ridership.
In both cases, we consider the effects on entry counts, exit counts, and the sum
of entries and exits.
4.6.1 Results
Results from these “first stage” analyses are presented in Tables 4.6 and 4.7. We
find evidence that both the juvenile curfew and bad weather have a “first stage” effect
on Metro ridership: Nighttime Metro exits are lower when an hour is post-curfew
and juveniles are supposed to be home for the evening. Similarly, Metro entries,
exits, and total traffic are lower during rainy hours than during dry hours.
We interpret these results as indicative that these incentive-based incapacitation
policies do reduce the total number of people out in public. However, there is a
difference in magnitude (rain affects ridership more than the curfew does), as well
as a difference in the populations targeted. Both of these differences likely affect the
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Table 4.6: Effect of Curfews and School on Night Metro Rides: Hourly Results
All SST Districts Anacostia (Police District 7)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Metro Entries
after curfew time 0.784 0.782 0.780 0.825 1.742*** 1.740**
(1.472) (1.474) (1.475) (0.786) (0.672) (0.673)
early curfew day -1.501 -1.492 -0.627 0.182 -0.474 0.145
(2.199) (2.185) (2.488) (1.203) (1.171) (1.220)
school in session -1.169 0.272 1.188** 2.328*
(1.364) (2.955) (0.551) (1.398)
school * early curfew day -1.957 -1.339
(3.219) (1.543)
Mean Entries 75.3 75.3 75.3 39.679 39.679 39.679
Metro Exits
after curfew time -4.246** -4.250** -4.259** 0.087 -3.379** -3.387**
(2.010) (2.012) (2.015) (1.989) (1.474) (1.477)
early curfew day 2.308 2.323 6.551* 3.083 8.028*** 10.500***
(3.514) (3.524) (3.639) (3.778) (2.449) (2.890)
school in session -1.971 5.067 5.378*** 9.925***
(2.414) (4.418) (2.016) (3.554)
school * early curfew day -9.558* -5.341
(5.192) (4.096)
Mean Exits 115.278 115.278 115.278 114.569 114.569 114.569
Metro Entries and Exits
after curfew time -3.462 -3.468 -3.479 0.912 -1.637 -1.647
(3.088) (3.092) (3.098) (2.172) (1.683) (1.687)
early curfew day 0.807 0.831 5.924 3.265 7.553** 10.645***
(5.466) (5.460) (5.748) (4.453) (3.250) (3.638)
school in session -3.140 5.339 6.566*** 12.252***
(3.148) (7.122) (2.340) (4.609)
school * early curfew day -11.515 -6.680
(8.105) (5.282)
Mean Activity 190.579 190.579 190.579 154.248 154.248 154.248
Observations 16023 16023 16023 2691 2691 2691
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Standard errors, clustered by day of year, are shown in parentheses. Outcome: Number of metro entries, exits, or
total entries & exits per hour. SST Districts: Police Districts 3, 5, 6, and 7. Years of analysis: 2011-2014. July 1-7
are excluded. Hours of analysis: 9pm-2am. All specifications include year, hour, day of week, & station FEs. Metro
ridership data source: Metro.
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Table 4.7: Effect of Precipitation on Metro Rides: Hourly Results
All hours Night only (9pm–2am)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Metro Entries
Rain (cm) -43.92∗∗∗ -45.64∗∗∗ -34.38∗∗∗ -20.62∗∗ -19.54 -16.76∗∗∗
(12.82) (13.10) (10.60) (8.064) (12.13) (4.661)
No-rain mean 226.2 228.3 195.3 81.47 84.84 41.82
Metro Exits
Rain (cm) -42.80∗∗∗ -47.29∗∗ -46.33∗∗∗ -33.75∗∗ -34.35 -39.50∗∗∗
(14.90) (20.74) (15.76) (13.40) (21.45) (9.224)
No-rain mean 218.8 220.2 188.1 121.2 127.4 112.3
Metro Entries and Exits
Rain (cm) -86.72∗∗∗ -92.93∗∗∗ -80.70∗∗∗ -54.37 ∗∗ -53.89 -56.27∗∗∗
(26.93) (32.82) (24.48) (21.30) (33.47) (13.46)
No-rain mean 445.0 448.5 383.4 202.6 212.3 154.2
Metro Entries
Any Rain -11.61∗∗ -13.84∗∗∗ -11.71∗∗∗ -5.656∗∗∗ -9.186∗∗ -5.485∗∗∗
(4.570) (5.237) (4.276) (1.834) (4.417) (1.147)
No-rain mean 226.2 228.3 195.3 81.47 84.84 41.82
Metro Exits
Any Rain -13.33∗∗∗ -14.52∗∗ -11.93∗∗∗ -9.808∗∗∗ -11.79 -14.34∗∗∗
(4.347) (6.426) (4.462) (2.635) (7.740) (2.644)
No-rain mean 218.8 220.2 188.1 121.2 127.4 112.3
Metro Entries and Exits
Any Rain -24.94∗∗∗ -28.36∗∗ -23.64∗∗∗ -15.465∗∗∗ -20.97∗ -19.82∗∗∗
(8.679) (10.96) (8.053) (4.266) (12.01) (3.664)
No-rain mean 445.0 448.5 383.4 202.6 212.3 154.2
Observations 346920 121789 58844 76315 26845 12839
Share of hours with any rain 0.036 0.024 0.036 0.037 0.026 0.037
Summer only (June-September) X X
Anacostia only X X
Night only (9pm to 2am) X X X
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Standard errors, clustered by day of year, are shown in parentheses. Outcome measure: Number of metro entries,
exits, or total entries and exits. Analysis uses data from Police Districts 3, 5, 6, and 7, unless otherwise noted. Years
of analysis: 2011-2014. Hourly observations with the top 1% of rainfall are excluded. All specifications include: year,
hour, week of year, day of week, and Metro station fixed effects. Precipitation data source: NOAA. Metro ridership
data source: Metro.
105
impact on gun violence.
Poisson regression results are very similar and available upon request.
4.7 Discussion
In this paper, we demonstrate the benefit of using gunshot incident data from
ShotSpotter to measure policy impacts on gun violence. These data are not affected
by the inaccuracies and selective underreporting that make traditional reported crime
data problematic. Not only are the resulting empirical estimates more precise, but
they do not suffer from (unsigned) bias that makes empirical results throughout the
literature difficult to interpret. Both of these factors are crucial for determining the
true impact of any policy on public safety.
To showcase the usefulness of these high-tech surveillance data, we examine the
impact of one city’s juvenile curfew policy on gun violence. The curfew policy in
Washington, DC, was enacted in 1995 as an effort to decrease urban violence. Similar
curfew laws are in effect across the United States, but are controversial, and in some
cases have been ruled unconstitutional. Their impact depends crucially on how they
are implemented and how police officers, law-abiding citizens, and would-be offenders
respond. We show that in this city, at least, there is no compelling evidence that the
juvenile curfew policy reduces gun violence. Given concerns that juvenile curfews
increase tensions between inner-city communities and law enforcement, our results
suggest that curfew laws are not a cost-effective way to reduce gun violence in U.S.
cities.
This does not necessarily mean that juvenile curfews are not cost-effective more
broadly. We cannot measure impacts on other types of crime — particularly minor
offenses — and so to the extent that such criminal activity is of concern and is not
correlated with gun violence, we might not observe a benefit of curfew policies. It is
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also possible that even if curfews do not reduce the number of gunshots, they might
reduce the number of victims when there are fewer innocent bystanders in the area.
However, we doubt that most residents would consider such an impact evidence of a
real improvement in public safety — gunfire would still be audible, and stray bullets
would still be a threat. In addition, juvenile curfews might increase the amount
of domestic violence by requiring kids to be home at night. This is an important
potential cost that should be considered.
For contrast, we consider the impact of rain, which sends would-be offenders in-
doors just as juvenile curfews try to do, but with a broader reach (it applies to all
would-be offenders, not just the young) and more consistent “enforcement” (anyone
who stays outside during a storm gets wet, not just those who are caught by police).
We show that rain has statistically significant and meaningful impacts on gun vio-
lence and reported crime during affected hours and over the full day. This suggests
that a substantial share of gun violence represents crimes of passion or opportunity
that are not shifted to other times. We interpret this as evidence that incapacitation
works as a crime-control policy — that is, criminals can be induced to move off the
streets and gun violence does fall as a result — but that how a policy is implemented
is crucial to its success.
We encourage policy-makers to invest in data sources similar to ShotSpotter, and
make them available to researchers. A wide array of high-tech surveillance tools are
currently employed by law enforcement, and their use will surely increase over time as
technology improves. Surveillance tools can be costly, both financially and in terms
of privacy, so it is important to rigorously evaluate their cost-effectiveness. However,
cost-benefit analyses should recognize the positive externalities resulting from the
collection of high-quality data: they can be used to evaluate and improve crime-
prevention policy outside the immediate jurisdiction. (This suggests that funding
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for such data collection should come from the state or federal government, rather
than cities and counties.) It is also important to recognize that the costs of sticking
with well-intentioned but ineffective policies, such as juvenile curfews, often include
damage to the relationship between police and the local community with broad
consequences that are difficult to measure. Better data will allow us to move toward
better, fairer, evidence-based policy, and minimize such unnecessary costs.
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5. CONCLUSION
The previous three sections showcase the inherent difficulty in designing policies
that reduce crime. This work shows that both sex offender registries and juvenile
curfews do not achieve their stated policy goals, and it highlights an unintended
consequence of one of the largest public assistance programs in the United States,
the Housing Choice Voucher Program.
These results all have significant policy implications. For both sex offender reg-
istries and juvenile curfews, these results suggest that policy-makers may not be able
to justify the additional costs imposed on the affected individuals with the benefits
of the policies.
For the case of sex offender registries, my results do suggest a benefit, but it
is not a stated goal of the policy. Because the reduction in crimes that I show is
for violations of probation or other court regulations, these results could be used to
justify an alteration to current probation policies.
Although juvenile curfews do not affect the overall number of crimes or gunshots,
this research is unable to rule out that they affect the number of crimes committed by
youths in general. The main policy prescription of this study may be that additional
methods and technology for tracking crime can yield considerable insights for policy-
makers.
Many policy implications can be drawn from the results on housing vouchers, but
the most prudent way to consider the increase in arrests for male heads of household
is to consider the ways in which the male and female heads of household differ. The
males are older, have smaller families and more significant criminal histories, and
they are less likely to move when they receive a voucher. Suggested changes to the
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program should not be along gender lines, but instead relate to these other aspects.
Exploring these differences is an avenue for future work on this topic.
Creating social policy is a difficult task not just because it is difficult politically,
but it is also challenging to consider the entire set of potential consequences. The
results contained in this dissertation add to the calculations of costs and benefits for
each of their respective policies and can contribute to the ongoing discourse on each
of these topics.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX FOR THE SECOND SECTION
A.1 Alternative Recidivism Windows
Table A.1: Effect of Registry Extension on Recidivism within 1 Year
11 month bandwidth 6 month bandwidth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
sex crime: whether offender recidivated
registry extended -0.0045 -0.0041 -0.0083 -0.0069
(0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012)
any crime type: whether offender recidivated
registry extended -0.0013 0.0081 -0.0243 -0.0124
(0.022) (0.021) (0.030) (0.029)
violent offenses: whether offender recidivated
registry extended -0.0049 -0.0030 -0.0050 -0.0026
(0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013)
property offenses: whether offender recidivated
registry extended 0.0066 0.0091 -0.0025 -0.0007
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
drug and alcohol offenses: whether offender recidivated
registry extended 0.0009 0.0040 -0.0104 -0.0066
(0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014)
procedural offenses: whether offender recidivated
registry extended 0.0014 0.0023 0.0086 0.0094
(0.009) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013)
num. of observations 2005 2005 1069 1069
covariates no yes no yes
time polynomial linear linear linear linear
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Notes: Each value in the table is generated by a separate regression. The reported coefficients are for the variable
“registry extended.” Recidivism measures are computed for the first year after the offender’s registry expiration date
or extension. Control variables include race dummies, gender, age, number of pre-registry convictions for any type
of offense and sex offenses, number of previous incarcerations and total time spent incarcerated before registry. The
running variable is the estimated registry date. The time polynomial is allowed to vary on either side of the cutoff.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered on the running variable.
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Table A.2: Effect of Registry Extension on Recidivism within 2 Years
11 month bandwidth 6 month bandwidth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
sex crime: whether offender recidivated
registry extended -0.0053 -0.0051 -0.0175 -0.0155
(0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.013)
any crime type: whether offender recidivated
registry extended -0.0376 -0.0251 -0.0579* -0.0413
(0.025) (0.024) (0.034) (0.032)
violent offenses: whether offender recidivated
registry extended -0.0121 -0.0097 -0.0128 -0.0101
(0.013) (0.012) (0.018) (0.017)
property offenses: whether offender recidivated
registry extended 0.0029 0.0064 0.0056 0.0076
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011)
drug and alcohol offenses: whether offender recidivated
registry extended -0.0016 0.0032 -0.0256 -0.0198
(0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.018)
procedural offenses: whether offender recidivated
registry extended -0.0118 -0.0104 0.0038 0.0055
(0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.015)
num. of observations 2005 2005 1069 1069
covariates no yes no yes
time polynomial linear linear linear linear
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Notes: Each value in the table is generated by a separate regression. The reported coefficients are for the variable
“registry extended.” Recidivism measures are computed for the 2 years after the offender’s registry expiration date
or extension. Control variables include race dummies, gender, age, number of pre-registry convictions for any type
of offense and sex offenses, number of previous incarcerations and total time spent incarcerated before registry. The
running variable is the estimated registry date. The time polynomial is allowed to vary on either side of the cutoff.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered on the running variable.
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Table A.3: Effect of Registry Extension on Recidivism within 4 Years
11 month bandwidth 6 month bandwidth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
sex crime: whether offender recidivated
registry extended -0.0003 0.0005 0.0016 0.0036
(0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.015)
any crime type: whether offender recidivated
registry extended -0.0332 -0.0155 -0.0559 -0.0347
(0.032) (0.030) (0.043) (0.039)
violent offenses: whether offender recidivated
registry extended -0.0000 0.0047 -0.0105 -0.0047
(0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.021)
property offenses: whether offender recidivated
registry extended 0.0107 0.0153 0.0091 0.0121
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013)
drug and alcohol offenses: whether offender recidivated
registry extended 0.0026 0.0102 -0.0264 -0.0179
(0.018) (0.017) (0.022) (0.022)
procedural offenses: whether offender recidivated
registry extended -0.0207* -0.0188 -0.0114 -0.0110
(0.012) (0.012) (0.018) (0.018)
num. of observations 2005 2005 1069 1069
covariates no yes no yes
time polynomial linear linear linear linear
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Notes: Each value in the table is generated by a separate regression. The reported coefficients are for the variable
“registry extended.” Recidivism measures are computed for the 4 years after the offender’s registry expiration date
or extension. Control variables include race dummies, gender, age, number of pre-registry convictions for any type
of offense and sex offenses, number of previous incarcerations and total time spent incarcerated before registry. The
running variable is the estimated registry date. The time polynomial is allowed to vary on either side of the cutoff.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered on the running variable.
123
Table A.4: Effect of Registry Extension on Recidivism within 5 Years
11 month bandwidth 6 month bandwidth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
sex crime: whether offender recidivated
registry extended -0.0016 -0.0005 0.0016 0.0036
(0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.015)
any crime type: whether offender recidivated
registry extended -0.0322 -0.0119 -0.0474 -0.0260
(0.032) (0.030) (0.043) (0.039)
violent offenses: whether offender recidivated
registry extended 0.0042 0.0098 -0.0089 -0.0029
(0.017) (0.016) (0.023) (0.021)
property offenses: whether offender recidivated
registry extended 0.0084 0.0139 0.0040 0.0067
(0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015)
drug and alcohol offenses: whether offender recidivated
registry extended -0.0110 -0.0023 -0.0342 -0.0253
(0.020) (0.020) (0.026) (0.025)
procedural offenses: whether offender recidivated
registry extended -0.0206 -0.0182 -0.0146 -0.0123
(0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.019)
num. of observations 2005 2005 1069 1069
covariates no yes no yes
time polynomial linear linear linear linear
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Notes: Each value in the table is generated by a separate regression. The reported coefficients are for the variable
“registry extended.” Recidivism measures are computed for the 5 years after the offender’s registry expiration date
or extension. Control variables include race dummies, gender, age, number of pre-registry convictions for any type
of offense and sex offenses, number of previous incarcerations and total time spent incarcerated before registry. The
running variable is the estimated registry date. The time polynomial is allowed to vary on either side of the cutoff.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered on the running variable.
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A.2 Classification of Conviction Crime Types into Categories
1. Violent Offenses - assault, attempted murder, kidnapping, manslaughter,
murder, robbery
2. Property Offenses - breaking and entering, burglary, forgery, fraud, theft
3. Drug and Alcohol Offenses - DUI, manufacture or sale of controlled substances,
possession of controlled substances, possession of drug paraphernalia
4. Procedural Offenses - contempt of court, failure to appear (felony), obstructing
justice, possession of firearm by felon, post release revocation
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX FOR THE THIRD SECTION
B.1 Classification of Arrest Crime Types into Categories
1. Violent Offenses - aggravated assault, arson, assault, kidnapping, murder,
robbery, sexual assault
2. Drug Offenses - alcohol related offenses, DUI, manufacture, possession or sale of
contraband products
3. Financially-Motivated Offenses - automobile theft, burglary, gambling, robbery,
shoplifting, theft, white collar crimes (forgery, fraud, etc.)
4. Unclassified Offenses - carrying/discharging prohibited weapons, criminal
mischief, criminal trespassing, evading arrest, indecent behavior/exposure, minor
traffic offenses, prostitution-related arrests
B.2 Effect of Vouchers on Arrests Controlling for Neighborhood
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B.3 Effect of Vouchers on Arrests with Leading Indicators
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX FOR THE FOURTH SECTION
C.1 Data Construction
Specific geographic descriptors in the ShotSpotter Technologies (SST) data allow us
to study the geographic effects of policy on gun crime, but they also create unique
challenges. In this data appendix, we seek to describe the data in detail to shed
light on potential uses as well as detail some of the more important GIS processes
necessary for the most likely uses.
There are many GIS software options (some of them free) and online geocoders
(again, some of them free) which can be used to process the geographic data. In
this appendix, all of the processing will occur in ArcMap. All operations described
are available on an “ArcView” level license.
C.1.1 Data description
The SST data from Washington, DC, are reported on the incident level. From
January 2006 through June 2013, there were 39,065 verified ShotSpotter activations
in the city. Each observation contains a set of descriptive variables: coverage area,
incident ID, date and time, type (single shot or multiple shots), longitude, and
latitude. The coverage area simply denotes the city and police district, not an
individual sensor. There were 3,832 incidents detected in District 1; 3,575 in
District 3; 3,018 in District 4; 4,097 in District 5; 10,683 in District 6; and 13,860 in
District 7. No shots were detected in District 2.
For most applications, some sort of geographic aggregation is ideal. For example, in
this study, we aggregate to the level of Police Service Areas (PSAs). Washington,
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DC, has 56 PSAs within 7 Police Districts. We focus on the districts in which SST
sensors are intentionally employed: Districts 3 (beginning July 2008), 5 (beginning
March 2008), 6 (beginning March 2008) and 7 (beginning January 2006). Together,
these districts have 31 PSAs. Note that there is substantial detection in
“uncovered” districts; we ignore these incidents because the location data are less
reliable.
Importantly, the DC Metropolitan Police Department’s reported crime data are
also on the incident-level and include the PSA in which each crime occurred. For
our application, we use a PSA by day panel and a PSA by hour panel.
C.1.2 Patterns in gunfire data
Of the 39,065 total incidents, 18,338 were single gunshots and 20,727 were multiple
gunshots.
ShotSpotter detected 1,808 incidents in 2006; 2,649 in 2007; 5,761 in 2008; 9,011 in
2009; 5,745 in 2010; 6,668 in 2011; 5,385 in 2012; and 2,038 in the first six months
of 2013.
Most gunfire occurs at night: 3% between 7 and 8pm, 5% between 8 and 9pm, 8%
between 9 and 10pm, 11% between 10 and 11pm, 13% between 11pm and midnight,
17% between midnight and 1am, 11% between 1 and 2am, 8% between 2 and 3am,
6% between 3 and 4am, and 3% between 4 and 5am.
Gunfire incidents occur year-round, but celebratory gunfire is clearly a problem in
January (New Year’s Eve) and July (4th of July). It is also possible that fireworks
on these holidays make it through the sensors’ screening algorithm and are
recorded as gunshots. Of the 26,809 incidents detected between 2009 and 2012 (the
years in which all sensors were active for the full year), 12% occurred in January
(67% of those on January 1st), and 34% in July (14% of those on July 4th and 40%
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on July 5th). Across other months: 3% occurred in February, 4% in March, 5% in
April, 6% in May, 9% in June, 5% in August, 5% in September, 6% in October, 5%
in November, and 6% in December.
Most gun violence occurs on weekends: 20% of incidents are detected on Sundays,
11% on Mondays, 13% on Tuesdays, 9% on Wednesdays, 12% on Thursdays, 14%
on Fridays, and 21% on Saturdays. (Note that these days are 12:00am-11:59pm,
and as such include late hours of the previous night.)
C.1.3 Mapping points
In order to aggregate the SST data to the PSA level, we use ESRI’s ArcMap GIS
software to first map the gunshots and then match them to the PSAs.
ArcMap allows users to input data as comma separated values text files; we input
the data in this form using the ”Add Data” button. Next, we use the ”Display XY
Data” option (found by right-clicking on the dataset in the Table of Contents
window) in order to add the gunshots to the map as point data. In the “Display
XY Data” options window that pops up, we specify longitude as the “X field” and
latitude as the “Y field.” The ”Z field” is left as “<None>.”
Importantly, the linear units for the map must be set to “Degree” either before or
during this operation because the program will not recognize that the units should
be degrees despite the field names indicating that. If the map document already
contains data in a coordinate system for which the unit is degree, then nothing
further needs to be done. This can be verified by looking at the bottom right
corner of the ArcMap window, where the cursor’s current location is given in the
units of the map. If the map has another unit, the points will be mapped in an
incorrect place.
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C.1.4 Joining points to administrative boundaries
Once the gunshot incidents are mapped, we perform a spatial join in order to
determine in which PSA they lie. Before joining, another shapefile containing the
areas (a shapefile of polygons) to which we plan to match is added to the map.
Right-clicking the point-type layer of the SST data in the Table of Contents window
brings up a number of options, we select “Joins and Relates” and then “Join.”
We then opt to “Join data from another layer based on spatial location” in the first
drop down menu, and then select the PSAs shapefile1 to which to match in the
second drop down menu. If all of the points fall within a polygon, and the polygons
do not overlap, the default join settings should be fine. If there are gunshot points
that fall outside of the polygon layer, then they can either be dropped or matched
to the nearest polygon. In this analysis, we drop those points because most occur
outside of city limits, and inference is clearer without them.
The output of the spatial join is a new point layer of gunshot incidents containing
additional columns from the polygon to which each point was joined. These
columns will typically contain information such as the area of the polygon, as well
as an unique identifier or “name” and whatever additional variables were in the
initial polygon dataset.
The resulting joined dataset can be output into a text file for use in a variety of
statistical software packages.
C.2 Additional Tables and Figures
C.2.1 Curfew: alternative estimations
1Available at http://data.dc.gov/.
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Table C.1: Effect of Curfews and School on Gun Violence – Varied Bandwidth
11pm - midnight All Day
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
4 weeks 3 weeks 2 weeks 4 weeks 3 weeks 2 weeks
All SST-Detected Gunshot Incidents
early curfew 0.008 0.017 0.013 0.058 0.046 0.035
(0.014) (0.016) (0.021) (0.069) (0.077) (0.087)
school in session -0.024*** -0.014* -0.020** -0.068 -0.067 -0.089
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.057) (0.065) (0.073)
school * early curfew 0.000 -0.006 -0.007 0.003 0.006 0.003
(0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.066) (0.072) (0.079)
mean daily activations .049 .051 .05 .412 .418 .407
SST-Detected Multiple Gunshot Incidents
early curfew 0.004 0.010 0.006 0.043 0.032 0.014
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.049) (0.056) (0.063)
school in session -0.022*** -0.018*** -0.024*** -0.063* -0.068 -0.092**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.037) (0.042) (0.044)
school * early curfew 0.002 -0.003 -0.005 -0.012 -0.011 -0.002
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.044) (0.048) (0.053)
mean daily activations .028 .029 .029 .242 .246 .238
Observations 18073 15735 13397 18073 15735 13397
MPD Reported Crimes
early curfew -0.002 0.014 -0.006 0.064 0.087 0.035
(0.015) (0.017) (0.020) (0.085) (0.089) (0.107)
school in session -0.041* -0.017 -0.036 0.102 0.137 0.124
(0.024) (0.030) (0.031) (0.083) (0.097) (0.116)
school * early curfew 0.004 -0.002 0.009 -0.176 -0.193* -0.141
(0.023) (0.024) (0.029) (0.106) (0.108) (0.125)
mean daily activations .100 .103 .103 1.817 1.822 1.825
MPD Reported Gun Crimes
early curfew -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.034 -0.037 -0.049*
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025)
school in session 0.001 0.000 -0.004 0.017 0.015 0.021
(0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.024) (0.028) (0.033)
school * early curfew 0.006 0.006 0.005 -0.012 -0.009 0.014
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.028) (0.027) (0.031)
mean daily activations .011 .012 .012 .135 .139 .143
MPD Reported Violent Crimes
early curfew -0.008 -0.011 -0.021* 0.035 0.034 0.044
(0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.044) (0.044) (0.046)
school in session -0.008 -0.010 -0.016 0.071 0.068 0.064
(0.014) (0.017) (0.019) (0.048) (0.054) (0.065)
school * early curfew 0.006 0.008 0.015 -0.065 -0.067 -0.081
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.056) (0.057) (0.064)
mean daily activations .033 .034 .034 .442 .45 .453
Observations 9951 8649 7347 9951 8649 7347
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Notes: Standard errors are clustered on the running variable (day of year) and are shown in parentheses. Outcome
measure: Number of gunshot incidents. Dates included: indicated number of weeks before and after July 1 and
September 1. Analysis uses data from Police Districts 3, 5, 6 and 7. Years 2006-2013 for SST data, 2011-13 for MPD
data. All specifications include: year, day of week and PSA fixed effects; precipitation; temperature. ShotSpotter
and reported crime data source: MPD. Weather data source: NOAA.
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Table C.2: Effect of Curfews and School on Any Gun Violence – Poisson
11pm - midnight All Day
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All SST-Detected Gunshot Incidents
early curfew 1.277 1.206 1.049 0.970 0.945 0.901
(0.297) (0.276) (0.296) (0.123) (0.120) (0.127)
school in session 0.517*** 0.359*** 0.754*** 0.671***
(0.127) (0.113) (0.073) (0.098)
school * early curfew 1.552 1.154
(0.591) (0.190)
mean daily activations .039 .039 .039 .338 .338 .338
SST-Detected Multiple Gunshot Incidents
early curfew 1.128 1.020 0.872 0.962 0.919 0.855
(0.300) (0.262) (0.277) (0.131) (0.128) (0.139)
school in session 0.380*** 0.249*** 0.637*** 0.533***
(0.114) (0.094) (0.064) (0.112)
school * early curfew 1.674 1.243
(0.714) (0.279)
mean daily activations .023 .023 .023 .197 .197 .197
Observations 12921 12921 12921 12921 12921 12921
MPD Reported Crimes
early curfew 0.962 0.964 0.999 0.958 0.958 1.044
(0.171) (0.171) (0.230) (0.039) (0.039) (0.058)
school in session 0.684 0.704 1.046 1.133**
(0.183) (0.181) (0.043) (0.062)
school * early curfew 0.940 0.861**
(0.273) (0.055)
mean daily reported crimes .089 .089 .089 1.693 1.693 1.693
MPD Reported Gun Crimes
early curfew 1.167 1.162 1.115 0.760 0.763 0.811
(0.584) (0.586) (1.113) (0.132) (0.133) (0.188)
school in session 0.874 0.854 1.304 1.363*
(0.597) (0.753) (0.221) (0.249)
school * early curfew 1.062 0.912
(1.194) (0.224)
mean daily gun crimes .01 .01 .01 .122 .122 .122
MPD Reported Violent Crimes
early curfew 0.908 0.906 0.782 0.986 0.987 1.108
(0.275) (0.276) (0.272) (0.083) (0.082) (0.134)
school in session 0.913 0.828 1.260** 1.391**
(0.458) (0.402) (0.134) (0.184)
school * early curfew 1.260 0.830
(0.453) (0.118)
mean daily violent crimes .031 .031 .031 .401 .401 .401
Observations 7068 7068 7068 7068 7068 7068
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Notes: Incident-rate ratios reported. Standard errors are clustered on the running variable (day of year) and are
shown in parentheses. Outcome measure: Number of gunshot incidents or reported crimes. Dates included: 4 weeks
before and after July 1 and September 1. Years 2006-2013 for gunshot data, years 2011-2013 for reported crime data.
Analysis uses data from Police Districts 3, 5, 6, and 7. All specifications include: year, day of week and PSA fixed
effects; precipitation; temperature. ShotSpotter reported crime data source: MPD. Weather data source: NOAA.
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Table C.3: Effect of Curfews and School on Any Gun Violence – Logit
11pm - midnight All Day
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All SST-Detected Gunshot Incidents
early curfew 1.059 1.015 0.812 0.988 0.965 0.869
(0.264) (0.252) (0.240) (0.120) (0.118) (0.144)
school in session 0.628** 0.365*** 0.739*** 0.600**
(0.133) (0.123) (0.086) (0.137)
school * early curfew 1.951* 1.306
(0.744) (0.293)
mean daily activations .03 .03 .03 .203 .203 .203
SST-Detected Multiple Gunshot Incidents
early curfew 0.938 0.874 0.723 0.897 0.866 0.747
(0.253) (0.235) (0.236) (0.135) (0.131) (0.154)
school in session 0.501*** 0.317*** 0.673*** 0.492***
(0.131) (0.118) (0.076) (0.127)
school * early curfew 1.778 1.492
(0.751) (0.398)
mean daily activations .018 .018 .018 .135 .135 .135
Observations 11086 11086 11086 12921 12921 12921
MPD Reported Crimes
early curfew 1.036 1.039 1.048 0.850 0.852 0.996
(0.208) (0.209) (0.278) (0.131) (0.131) (0.200)
school in session 0.746 0.751 0.728** 0.839
(0.198) (0.193) (0.092) (0.152)
school * early curfew 0.986 0.771
(0.321) (0.151)
mean daily reported crimes .084 .084 .084 .78 .78 .78
MPD Reported Gun Crimes
early curfew 1.268 1.271 1.336 0.726 0.727 0.776
(0.688) (0.685) (1.452) (0.144) (0.144) (0.211)
school in session 1.059 1.090 1.279 1.343*
(0.667) (0.950) (0.195) (0.231)
school * early curfew 0.931 0.904
(1.109) (0.259)
mean daily gun crimes .01 .01 .01 .111 .111 .111
MPD Reported Violent Crimes
early curfew 0.958 0.959 0.760 0.928 0.927 0.972
(0.304) (0.303) (0.279) (0.113) (0.114) (0.172)
school in session 1.043 0.891 1.157 1.207
(0.474) (0.421) (0.114) (0.167)
school * early curfew 1.443 0.924
(0.580) (0.188)
mean daily violent crimes .031 .031 .031 .319 .319 .319
Observations 7068 7068 7068 7068 7068 7068
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Notes: Odds ratios reported. Standard errors are clustered on the running variable (day of year) and are shown in
parentheses. Outcome measure: 0/1 indicator of any gunshot incidents or reported crimes. Dates included: 4 weeks
before and after July 1 and September 1. Years 2006-2013 for gunshot data, years 2011-2013 for reported crime data.
Analysis uses data from Police Districts 3, 5, 6, and 7. All specifications include: year, day of week and PSA fixed
effects; precipitation; temperature. ShotSpotter reported crime data source: MPD. Weather data source: NOAA.
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C.2.2 Rain: alternative estimations
Table C.4: Effect of Precipitation on Gun Violence: Hourly Including Outliers
All hours Night only (9pm–2am)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All SST-Detected Gunshot Incidents
Rain (cm) -0.012∗∗∗ -0.013∗ -0.014∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.013) (0.012)
No-rain mean 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.07
SST-Detected Multiple Gunshot Incidents
Rain (cm) -0.008∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006)
No-rain mean 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.04
Observations 1554528 517248 502656 388290 129312 125664
MPD Reported Crimes
Rain (cm) -0.005 -0.001 0.000 -0.021∗∗ -0.020 -0.009
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011)
No-rain mean 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.06
MPD Reported Gun Crimes
Rain (cm) 0.000 0.003 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.010∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
No-rain mean 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
MPD Reported Violent Crimes
Rain (cm) -0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.009∗∗ -0.007 -0.017∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
No-rain mean 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
Observations 678528 203856 175104 169632 50964 43776
Average hourly rainfall (cm) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
Average non-zero hourly rainfall (cm) 0.18 0.29 0.20 0.18 0.34 0.21
Summer only (June-September) X X
Anacostia only X X
Night only (9pm to 2am) X X X
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Notes: Standard errors, clustered by day of year, are shown in parentheses. Outcome measure: Number of gunshot
incidents or reported crimes. Rain outliers not dropped. Analysis uses data from Police Districts 3, 5, 6, and 7,
unless otherwise noted. Years of analysis: 2006-2013 for ShotSpotter data. 2011-2013 for reported crime data. All
specifications include: year, month, hour, week of year, day of week, and PSA fixed effects. Precipitation data source:
NOAA. ShotSpotter and reported crime data source: MPD.
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Table C.5: Effect of Precipitation on Gun Violence: Hourly – Poisson
All hours Night only (9pm–2am)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Any SST-Detected Gunshot Incidents
Rain (cm) 0.212∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.094) (0.087) (0.085) (0.109) (0.091)
No-rain mean 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.07
Any SST-Detected Multiple Gunshot Incidents
Rain (cm) 0.220∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗ 0.153∗∗
(0.082) (0.119) (0.114) (0.092) (0.121) (0.115)
No-rain mean 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.04
Observations 1553596 516525 502336 388290 129094 125536
Any MPD Reported Crimes
Rain (cm) 0.894 0.945 0.986 0.646∗∗ 0.621∗∗ 0.939
(0.084) (0.119) (0.109) (0.116) (0.143) (0.198)
No-rain mean 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.06
Any MPD Reported Gun Crimes
Rain (cm) 0.672 0.928 0.507 0.482∗ 0.486 0.221
(0.212) (0.330) (0.261) (0.194) (0.261) (0.216)
No-rain mean 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Any MPD Reported Violent Crimes
Rain (cm) 0.761 0.954 0.711 0.485∗∗∗ 0.434∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗
(0.145) (0.234) (0.168) (0.119) (0.111) (0.166)
No-rain mean 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
Observations 678249 203608 175032 169539 50677 43752
Average hourly rainfall (cm) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Average non-zero hourly rainfall (cm) 0.16 0.24 0.17 0.18 0.27 0.18
Summer only (June-September) X X
Anacostia only X X
Night only (9pm to 2am) X X X
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Notes: Incident-rate ratios reported. Standard errors, clustered by day of year, are shown in parentheses. Outcome
measure: Number of gunshot incidents or reported crimes. Coefficients reported as incident-rate ratios: 1 indicates
no difference between rainy and non-rainy hours. Analysis uses data from Police Districts 3, 5, 6, and 7, unless
otherwise noted. Years of analysis: 2006-2013 for ShotSpotter data. 2011-2013 for reported crime data. Hourly
observations with the top 1% of rainfall are excluded. All specifications include: year, month, hour, week of year,
day of week, and PSA fixed effects. Precipitation data source: NOAA. ShotSpotter and reported crime data source:
MPD.
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Table C.6: Effect of Any Precipitation on Any Gun Violence: Hourly – Logit
All hours Night only (9pm–2am)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Any SST-Detected Gunshot Incidents
Any rain 0.727∗∗∗ 0.647∗∗∗ 0.789∗∗∗ 0.733∗∗∗ 0.567∗∗∗ 0.764∗∗
(0.041) (0.064) (0.056) (0.057) (0.078) (0.080)
No-rain mean 0.013 0.017 0.018 0.030 0.043 0.044
Any SST-Detected Multiple Gunshot Incidents
Any rain 0.693∗∗∗ 0.618∗∗∗ 0.797∗∗ 0.701∗∗∗ 0.522∗∗∗ 0.781∗
(0.052) (0.065) (0.080) (0.073) (0.070) (0.116)
No-rain mean 0.007 0.011 0.010 0.017 0.027 0.025
Observations 1553596 516525 502336 388290 129094 125536
Any MPD Reported Crimes
Any rain 0.927∗∗∗ 0.926 0.946 0.878∗∗ 0.916 0.862∗
(0.024) (0.049) (0.039) (0.050) (0.114) (0.067)
No-rain mean 0.066 0.071 0.055 0.071 0.079 0.058
Any MPD Reported Gun Crimes
Any rain 0.881 0.858 0.786∗∗ 0.779∗ 0.696 0.577∗∗
(0.073) (0.133) (0.095) (0.010) (0.181) (0.138)
No-rain mean 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.009 0.010 0.012
Any MPD Reported Violent Crimes
Any rain 0.843∗∗∗ 0.897 0.828∗∗ 0.720∗∗∗ 0.773∗ 0.627∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.091) (0.064) (0.061) (0.117) (0.076)
No-rain mean 0.017 0.018 0.019 0.025 0.028 0.027
Observations 678249 203608 175032 169539 50677 43752
Share of hours with any rain 0.062 0.043 0.061 0.065 0.043 0.063
Summer only (June-September) X X
Anacostia only X X
Night only (9pm to 2am) X X X
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Notes: Odds ratios reported. Standard errors, clustered by day of year, are shown in parentheses. Outcome measure:
0/1 Indicator of any gunshot incidents or reported crimes. Coefficients reported as odds ratios: 1 indicates no
difference between rainy and non-rainy hours. Analysis uses data from Police Districts 3, 5, 6, and 7, unless otherwise
noted. Years of analysis: 2006-2013 for ShotSpotter data. 2011-2013 for reported crime data. Hourly observations
with the top 1% of rainfall are excluded. All specifications include: year, month, hour, week of year, day of week,
and PSA fixed effects. Precipitation data source: NOAA. ShotSpotter and reported crime data source: MPD.
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Table C.7: Effect of Precipitation on Gun Violence: Daily – Poisson
(1) (2) (3)
All SST-Detected Gunshot Incidents
Rain (cm) 0.902∗∗ 0.855∗ 0.925∗
(0.045) (0.072) (0.037)
No-rain mean 0.53 0.68 0.71
SST-Detected Multiple Gunshot Incidents
Rain (cm) 0.912 0.847∗ 0.932
(0.053) (0.082) (0.044)
No-rain mean 0.29 0.41 0.38
Observations 66900 22259 21632
MPD Reported Crimes
Rain (cm) 0.965∗∗∗ 0.968∗∗∗ 0.975∗∗
(0.007) (0.009) (0.010)
No-rain mean 1.70 1.83 1.38
MPD Reported Gun Crimes
Rain (cm) 0.922∗∗∗ 0.926∗∗∗ 0.902∗∗
(0.023) (0.022) (0.040)
No-rain mean 0.14 0.13 0.18
MPD Reported Violent Crimes
Rain (cm) 0.954∗∗∗ 0.954∗∗ 0.961∗
(0.014) (0.018) (0.022)
No-rain mean 0.42 0.45 0.48
Observations 29202 8773 7536
Average daily rainfall (cm) 0.27 0.31 0.28
Average non-zero daily rainfall (cm) 0.87 1.03 0.91
Summer only (June-September) X
Anacostia only X
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Notes: Incident-rate ratios reported. Standard errors, clustered by day of year, are shown in parentheses. Outcome
measure: 0/1 Indicator of any gunshot incidents or reported crimes. Coefficients are reported as odds ratios. Analysis
uses data from Police Districts 3, 5, 6, 7, unless otherwise noted. Years of analysis: 2006-2013 for ShotSpotter data.
2011-2013 for reported crime data. All specifications include: year, month, week of year, day of week, and PSA fixed
effects. Precipitation data source: NOAA. ShotSpotter and reported crime data source: MPD.
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Table C.8: Effect of Any Precipitation on Any Gun Violence: Daily – Logit
(1) (2) (3)
All SST-Detected Gunshot Incidents
Any rain 0.833∗∗∗ 0.767∗∗∗ 0.845∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.052) (0.039)
No-rain mean 0.217 0.253 0.308
SST-Detected Multiple Gunshot Incidents
Any rain 0.863∗∗∗ 0.761∗∗∗ 0.873∗∗
(0.035) (0.056) (0.046)
No-rain mean 0.135 0.176 0.192
Observations 66900 22259 21632
MPD Reported Crimes
Any rain 1.02 1.00 0.985
(0.033) (0.063) (0.057)
No-rain mean 0.766 0.788 0.726
MPD Reported Gun Crimes
Any rain 0.964 0.950 0.903
(0.040) (0.075) (0.063)
No-rain mean 0.125 0.122 0.165
MPD Reported Violent Crimes
Any rain 0.970 0.975 0.945
(0.029) (0.052) (0.053)
No-rain mean 0.325 0.348 0.372
Observations 29202 8773 7536
Share of days with rainfall 0.314 0.302 0.307
Summer only (June-September) X
Anacostia only X
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Notes: Standard errors, clustered by day of year, are shown in parentheses. Outcome measure: 0/1 Indicator of
any gunshot incidents or reported crimes. Coefficients are reported as odds ratios. Analysis uses data from Police
Districts 3, 5, 6, 7, unless otherwise noted. Years of analysis: 2006-2013 for ShotSpotter data. 2011-2013 for reported
crime data. All specifications include: year, month, week of year, day of week, and PSA fixed effects. Precipitation
data source: NOAA. ShotSpotter and reported crime data source: MPD.
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